

16. 719

**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : Chief, Military Administrative and Supply Branch

FROM : Major Arthur B. Griffin, Jr.

DATE: 15 May 1945

SUBJECT: Returnee Report in Accordance with General Order No. 63.

1. Upon arrival in the ETO on 23 November 1943 I was assigned to Services Branch as Motor Transportation Officer. In addition to the operation of the Motor Pool in London, I was also charged with the responsibility of obtaining and operating all OSS Buildings in the London area. At the time of my arrival the OSS Headquarters consisted of three (3) buildings at 59, 71 and 72 Grosvenor Street. At the peak of operations the following additional buildings were acquired:

14 Grosvenor Street	70 Brook Street
24 Grosvenor Street	48 Portman Square
28 Grosvenor Street	49 Portman Square
51 Grosvenor Street	50 Portman Square
14 Mount Row	49 Mount Street
68 Brook Street	50 Mount Street

Additional buildings were subsequently obtained for storage space and for holding areas for Schools and Training Branch.

2. I remained in the above capacity until 17 July 1944 when I was sent to France with three (3) enlisted men as the Advanced Detachment of the Forward Echelon of OSS on the Continent. My job was to locate and set up a suitable HQ pending the arrival of additional Branch personnel from the UK. Such a HQ was located in St. Pair sur Mer and consisted of one hotel which was used as an office building and billet, a casino which housed the combined Officer and Enlisted mess and four (4) chalets for Officer's Billets. The HQ was ready to receive the first lift of personnel on 15 August 1944.

3. The next move was to Paris on 2 September 1944. I proceeded to Paris with Col. Reutershan and several Enlisted men and immediately requisitioned the office building at 79 Champs Elysees, the Powers, Elysees Park and Gallia Hotels and the Doucet Restaurant. This HQ was ready to operate at full capacity within one week. While in Paris from 2 September 1944 to 4 November 1944 I acted in the capacity of Services Officer but on 4 November I returned to London, where I was appointed Executive Officer, Services Branch, ETO, a position I am now holding. As such, it is my responsibility to assist Major McCoy, Chief of Services Branch, in the supervision of the activities of the various sections of the branch which are as follows:

1st Ind.

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MILITARY ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH AND SUPPLY DIVISION, ADMINISTRATIVE  
SERVICES, OAS, Washington, D. C., 17 May 1945

TO: Reports Office, Secretariat, OAS.  
THRU: Deputy Director, Administrative Services

Re: communication from Major Griffin forwarded as required  
by GO No. 52.

For Chief, Military Adm. Branch and Supply Division:

J. CARINI,  
Major, CMP,  
Personnel Officer.

1st Ind.

MILITARY ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH AND SUPPLY DIVISION, ADMINISTRATIVE  
SERVICES, OSS, Washington, D. C., 17 May 1945

TO: Reports Office, Secretariat, OSS.  
THRU: Deputy Director, Administrative Services

Basic communication from Major Griffin forwarded as required  
by GO No. 63.

For Chief, Military Adm. Branch and Supply Division:

*J. Carini*  
J. CARINI,  
Major, CMP,  
Personnel Officer.

16, 719  
Filed Report  
Griffin, A.G.  
50/Jul

1st Ind.

MILITARY ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH AND SUPPLY DIVISION, ADMINISTRATIVE  
SERVICES, OSS, Washington, D. C., 17 May 1946

TO: Reports Office, Secretariat, OSS.  
THRU: Deputy Director, Administrative Services

Basic communication from Major Griffin forwarded as required  
by GO No. 63.

For Chief, Military Adm. Branch and Supply Division:

*J. Carini*  
Major, CMP,  
Personnel Officer.

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*Field Report*  
*May 1946*  
30/Jul




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Post Mediterranean D-day Activities: Not long after Mediterranean D-day the "communications chains", as expected, started to disintegrate. This was caused not only by the utter confusion in southern France, but also due to the fact that the heads of the chains were following our instructions to act as tactical intelligence teams and to report by radio and courier to the Allied ground forces in France. The role played by Barcelona automatically decreased in importance and our job was practically over. Early in September one of the Consuls returned from the frontier with the news that an American Lieutenant had come down to the frontier post and, seeing an American Consul there, informed him that he was most anxious to speak to me. This Lieutenant had been sent by Zenda to that region to contact members of the various chains. Since the Consul had to return to Perpignan the following morning, I decided to accompany him. I found that this proved to be a wise move and many problems, too numerous and complicated to mention here, were ironed out to the benefit of the service and the United States Government as a whole. I later made several other trips to France, mainly to assist in the liquidation of the chains and also in order to call upon personally many of our key-men and subagents I had formerly known only by code names.

Barcelona Office was also called upon, after Mediterranean D-day to transport five "bodies" to France, three of them to Paris. This was arranged satisfactorily and after much careful planning, and the record was established when "Artichoke" arrived in Paris three days after having left Barcelona.

Liquidation of Barcelona Office: In December 1944 and upon the insistence of the Ambassador, I was forced to liquidate all SI affairs in Barcelona. This in itself is a ticklish and difficult job, involving long hours of conversation with agents who are being discharged, liquidating accounts, houses, apartments, employees, etc. All discharged employees were treated handsomely and adequately remunerated so as to enable them to live until such time as they might secure employment elsewhere. Those who still remained in jail at the time of my departure were given a cash settlement, each on his individual merits, and I am satisfied that all will agree that they have been fairly treated. In discharging several of my key-men who would be in a position to render services in the future, if we so desire, I explained carefully to them that it was conceivable that we might desire their assistance at some time in the future and I made a careful record of their names, addresses and countersigns to be used in re-establishing contact and these records are in the Madrid office. All files were sent by pouch to Madrid and the more important of those have been forwarded to Washington. The furniture, with the exception of the safe which was turned over to X-2, was given into the custody of the Consulate under a State Department arrangement whereby the Department is to get all furniture, etc. left in the Consulates by the various Government agencies.


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their use. We were fortunate in not having had the papers of any of our men questioned, but had they been, we were assured that they would at least pass the first and most important test.

X-2 relations in Barcelona: Counter espionage activities were carried out on a rather extensive scale long prior to the time when X-2 sent a man of their own there. When this man did arrive, he found an established organization to take over, together with approximately 3,000 cross-indexed cards at his disposal. With this ideal set-up to start from the rest was easy. The X-2 activities in Barcelona have greatly expanded since then and it has developed into a most important organization. In order to show positive accomplishments its activities must be closely coordinated with those of the Their mission and it is hoped that this will eventually be accomplished. X-2 has taken over many ex-GI agents and safe meeting places. With the sole exception of the contact with "Artichoke", whom I continued to see personally, all strictly X-2 activities were taken over by that office. It was felt that since his activities concerned SI directly, more so than X-2, it was preferable for me to continue the relationship until the time "Artichoke" left Spain.

Liquidation of chains: After the Mediterranean D-day the control exercised by the Barcelona office over the chains steadily disintegrated as this function was assumed by Zenda's team in France. Zenda and his men proceeded, as best they could under the circumstances, to call on each individual member of each chain, accompanied whenever possible by the head of the respective chain, in order to get full names, addresses and a short history of the participation of the sub-agents in the activities of the chain. It was found that many of these sub-agents had done work which warranted more than a mere expression of thanks on our part and machinery was set up to secure for them some American military decoration. In some cases the French authorities have also agreed that certain men of ours also deserved French decorations. The liquidation of the chains and the awarding of decorations is being adequately handled by Zenda's organization and in December 1944, was proceeding at a satisfactory rate. Immediately after the German retreat in southern France the greater majority of the members of our chains came out into the open and publicly boasted of their clandestine activities during the German occupation. In many cases it was necessary for Zenda and his men to vouch for the veracity of these claims, due to the fact that many of our men were supposed, by their neighbors, to have been mildly collaborationists. In several cases our intervention was necessary to secure the release from prison of these alleged "collaborationists". None of the members of our chains were paid a salary as such - we merely provided them with the necessary expenses incurred in traveling and gathering intelligence. In cases where agents did not have other means of income, we paid living expenses for them and their families.

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It took five months and 58,000 pesetas to duplicate the Vichy Police badges. The die-makers did a magnificent job under the circumstances and tried three times unsuccessfully. However, they were worth waiting for, as proven by the use of these badges by our men in France. The original dies and some of the badges are now in Washington. We sent them to Algiers, together with some badges, to be used by Algiers' agents in France. We also supplied the French Intelligence Service with the false documents they required.

Our stock of false documents, rubber stamps, etc. are also now in Washington on file.

Now that there exists in Washington a section for reproducing such foreign documents it is hoped that future missions in the field will be spared these trials and tribulations and will be supplied from Washington with all the necessary paraphernalia. This will, however, depend on whether the agent in the field takes time to send in to Washington samples of all documents he can secure, together with complete details as to how and where they are to be used.

While our reproductions of identity papers were by no means perfect, our men in France insisted that all that was needed of a document was to have it look well enough to pass inspection on a train and periodic street checks. That our documents were good enough for this purpose is proven by the fact that in many instances they were presented to Police authorities for revalidation and were not discovered. It is next to impossible to reproduce a paper or cardboard with a watermark unless it is done under ideal conditions with all necessary materials and facilities at hand. This cannot be accomplished clandestinely.

We found that in France when the Gestapo or Vichy Police suspected a man of having false papers their first check was to call the town where the papers were alleged to have been issued to see if the name and number of said identity card were registered with the proper authorities. If they were not, then the man was lost and in many cases, such as reported by the AKAK's, offenders were shot on the spot in railroad stations to serve as a lesson to others. In order to further protect our men we requested the chiefs which had agents in the Police offices to submit lists taken at random of individuals who had clean records and were not wanted by the Police on any charges whatsoever -- preferably collaborationists. The chiefs responded to the call and we eventually had quite a collection of real names, addresses, description, age, etc. of men ranging from young to old, tall and short, blond and brunette. Part of these lists were made available to Algiers and Bilbao for

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from France across the Pyrenees. The greater majority of these men were loyal and patriotic Frenchmen who were anxious to do something for the cause. Some were particularly anxious to get to Algiers to join the Army while others were perfectly willing to return to France to do intelligence work. Through AJAJ and other cut-outs with access to the French Red Cross, where all refugees were registered and interviewed, we had access to the more promising Frenchmen for our purpose. Once a man had been recruited and we had decided to send him to France to establish a chain, invariably the first thing he needed were documents - identity papers, travel permits, ration books, etc. We could never hope to send any man to France without papers which were good enough to at least allow him to travel to his destination or to where he was known and could get others. It was therefore necessary for us to provide them with false papers and AJAJ, who is an expert at such things, was assigned to the job. A contact in the French Red Cross was most helpful in sending us samples of all the documents he could collect from refugees. These were turned over to AJAJ to have copied. AJAJ had established contact with some printers, engravers and the like who were willing to do this work clandestinely. Their prices were outrageous but without false documents we could not start chains so we were forced to bow to the inevitable. I never realized how much work was involved until AJAJ was arrested and I inherited this onerous job.

The duplication of a document involved three entirely separate steps. I would give the original to a "cut-out", who in turn gave it to an "artist" who would draw an enlarged sample of the document. This drawing would be returned to me for checking as to spelling, commas, periods, etc., and if approved would be returned to the "cut-out", who then delivered the drawing to the man who made the metal engraving. This man would send back the engraving and a sample, and if he had not made a mistake in the spelling, etc., it would be sent to the printers, whose job it was to duplicate the paper and deliver the final duplicates. This three-way process, involving checking three times usually took between two and three weeks. Since these men were rather careless and we were so exacting, I invariably had to return a man's work at some stage of the process because he had misspelled a word, left out a comma, etc. This was exasperating to say the least but could not be remedied. The artist, engravers and printers were very nonchalant about whether they did the work or not and I couldn't complain too bitterly for fear of their refusing to do the work at all. Rubber stamps were also duplicated and hundreds were required. Duplicate copies of all documents, together with the necessary rubber stamps and samples of how to use them were sent to both Algiers and London. Not once did we ever receive any from them in return. It was a one-way deal and should have been the other way around.

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the agents. For the AKAK and HONO chains I finally made arrangements for the "communications chain" contact at the Spanish frontier to purchase all the necessary articles and send them across the frontier and then submitting the bill to me for payment. This was a much more satisfactory way of doing things and saved me a great deal of time.

We also supplied the AKAK chain with two radio transmitters, which were installed in the vicinity of Marseille. The forwarding of two complete radio transmitters from Barcelona to Marseille clandestinely is no simple matter and was a long and drawn out process. First I had a carpenter make four strong wooden boxes for the main parts of each set. One set of boxes was carefully wrapped in wrapping paper and marked and despatched and the other set despatched a week later. Despatching eight boxes meant seeing the AKAK Barcelona agent eight times - he in turn seeing the courier eight times. The courier transported them to close to the frontier and they crossed the frontier, one by one, clandestinely and by night over the mountains. Once they arrived safely in France they were taken to Toulouse, where the eight boxes were assembled and "Simon" and "Castillo", his brother, packed four boxes to a suitcase and left by train for Marseille. Upon arrival at Marseille the Gestapo surrounded the station and searched everyone, clothing and luggage, but allowed "Simon" and "Castillo" to go through the gates unchecked because we had provided them with false Vichy Police papers and badges. Had they been caught they would have, of course, been shot on the spot.

On one occasion, a courier in France was transporting some coffee, sugar and cigarettes for the HONO chain when the train was searched by the Gestapo, but when the Gestapo came to and searched the luggage containing these supplies, our man was not around to admit he owned the contraband. He lost the supplies but escaped safely.

Parachute Program: It is indeed most unfortunate that we were not able to start organizing this program long before we did. It was first mentioned in early 1942 and had we not encountered so many difficulties, both in France and in Algiers, we could have had a more efficient radio communications service operating out of France than was eventually accomplished. A great deal of credit for the work we did accomplish is due to the tireless efforts of Morey, who acted as personal liaison man between Algiers, Madrid, London and Barcelona, bringing to each organization the on-the-spot picture of the difficulties encountered by the others. We finally got the program into working order and in spite of bad weather on many occasions, managed to make some parachute drops, including radio operators with transmitting sets, to the AKAK, UPUP and HONO chains. Had we been able to start this program earlier we should have had southern France literally "plastered" with radio sets.

False Identity Papers: This was, without exception, the most time-consuming job I encountered in Barcelona. In 1943 and the early part of 1944 a large number of Frenchmen were escaping

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It was also due to this careful planning and mutual confidence that enabled us to later tie in the HOHO, HIHI and OPOP chains with the AKAK chain, thus saving these chains from complete disintegration.

In January 1944 the intelligence received from the old and the newly established chains started to increase both in quantity as well as quality and reached its peak in May 1944 when we received a total of twenty-eight pouches from the chains. During this month the Barcelona office also despatched thirty-one pouches to the chains, containing letters on current operations, instructions, etc.

Countersigns: It was found in our operations in France that what we called "countersigns" were indispensable and whenever possible an agent was provided with one. By the use of countersigns the only means possible of contacting an agent cut off from us was available. In one case, where we did not have a countersign, almost disastrous results occurred. HOHO did not have a countersign with R-18 and when we wished to send "Simon" to contact R-18 in order for "Simon" to provide communications for R-18, HOHO thought that by writing R-18 a letter in his, HOHO's, handwriting and mentioning several things known only to both of them, R-18 would recognize "Simon" as bona fide and accept him into his home and confidence. Such was far from the case. When "Simon" delivered the letter R-18 read it attentively and blandly announced that the letter was a mystery to him and that he had never heard of the alleged author of same. "Simon" was almost desperate - he knew he had the right man but how to convince R-18 that he came from us and was not in reality an agent of the Gestapo? No words of argument or persuasion would change R-18's stand and it is fortunate that "Simon" had a sub-agent of his own in the same town. He went to this sub-agent and explained his predicament and asked if the sub-agent knew R-18. By coincidence he did and he immediately went to R-18 and vouched for "Simon", thus establishing contact between the AKAK and HOHO chains. R-18 later insisted he recognized HOHO's handwriting and presumed HOHO had actually written it, but was not sure that it had not been written under duress and he, R-18, was not taking any chances. This case proves the absolute necessity of having a countersign with each and every agent in the field. In the event of being cut off from the "home office" he can be contacted by roundabout means, but if he does not have a countersign it is very likely he will not even talk to the person approaching him on such delicate matters, much less if his life is at stake.

Contact has been reestablished with the OPOP, HOHO, HIHI, YAYA and OROR chains by the use of countersigns and I am quite sure it would not have been possible had not each one of these people had a countersign known only to themselves and to the "home office".

Supplies to the Chains: The greater majority of the "communications chains" were capable of handling the traffic of supplies to the chains in France. For morale purposes we sent at frequent intervals supplies of cigarettes, soap, coffee, clothing, shoes, etc. to the heads of the chains to be distributed as they best saw fit. There is no question but this was money well spent and the heads of the chains without exception have assured me that this service, as much as anything, kept sub-agents enthusiastic and working. This service of supplies was a problem in itself which involved a great deal of time taking work to buy, wrap and deliver the packages to

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mail for some reason or another, the agent was assured a reply would be forthcoming at a later date and this promise was always kept. In the case of the AKAK chain particularly this was the rule and rarely did a courier arrive with a package and a letter regarding operations from "Simon" that he did not return the very next day with a reply to "Simon's" numerous questions regarding the many problems confronting him and his organization in France. The complete files of letters to and from "Simon" have been forwarded to Washington and are in the Registry files.

Soon after I arrived in Barcelona I noticed that the reports coming in from the HOHO chain were by far superior in neatness, accuracy and more complete than those received from the other chains. The reason for this was that HOHO had had experience in this type of work and knew how to teach his sub-agents how to do good work. I hit upon the idea (for lack of a better way - due to lack of time and material) of photostating a series of what we called ideal reporting from the HOHO chain, cutting out all marks of identity as to location, etc., and sending samples of these so-called "ideal reports" to the other chains as samples of how we wanted intelligence reported. The reaction was most impressive. Heads of chains asked for more copies and we began reaping the good results in the next few months, January to March 1944, when the quality of all reporting improved a great deal. At about this time Zenda started sending us some printed instructions, amply illustrated, and microfilmed on small sheets of paper. These were immediately despatched to the chains and all, without exception, demanded more. They wanted each and every man to see and study each individual report. The results were astounding. The order of battle reporting increased by leaps and bounds, as did the train watching services. It would be interesting to know how many railroad junctions our chains "covered". I am sure the number would be rather impressive.

"Simon" assured me on one occasion that he and his brother could not have worked so hard and enthusiastically if they had not been so pleased at the way the Barcelona office handled the AKAK chain. They both had the utmost confidence in us and followed our instructions to the letter, never questioning any decision or instructions. We too, on the other hand, never let them down and carried out to the letter every request they made. It is only under such conditions that a strong and efficient chain can operate.

Post D-day instructions were sent to the chains in cipher and all chain heads were impressed with the one-time-pads once they were received and had mastered the technique.

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and walked right into the trap. He neglected to look at the living room window and when Lucie opened the door and asked him, as if to a perfect stranger although they were old friends, "What do you want?" he still didn't realize anything was wrong and said "Hello, Lucie, is Pierre in?" At that moment a Policeman stepped from behind the door and HOND then realized what was happening and darted down the stairs, but unfortunately was captured by other policemen and overpowered. Had he heeded my warnings, or at least have lived up to security rules of always looking at the living room window before approaching AJAJ's house, he would not have been arrested and spent fifty days in jail. He was very fortunate that we were able to get him out that soon. Another man, passing that day, as did I also driving by in my car, immediately noticed the lowered drape and knew something was wrong.

Office Equipment: We were required to purchase all our necessary office equipment. The typewriters were rented on a monthly basis, as was our own private switchboard, which was connected to the Consulate switchboard. Desks, chairs, rugs, safes, tables, etc. were purchased in the local stores. The doors leading to other Consulate offices were sound-proofed with cork board purchased locally. We also purchased an invaluable photostat machine and a camera and tripod for microfilming. Eventually we had an entire room used exclusively for photostatic and photographic work. This "laboratory" was turned over to X-2 when I liquidated SI affairs in Barcelona.

Correspondence with and Instructions to the Chains: It is a fallacy to be under the impression that to run a chain all that is required is to send a man out and merely sit in an office and await results. To keep a chain functioning properly and to obtain the best results from its operations, requires the constant attention and care of at least one individual. And it is preferable that one man supervise one chain from start to finish. Chains are like intricate mechanisms which, in order to function properly, must be kept carefully "greased and in trim". The psychological factor is by far the most important and an agent in the field, usually risking his life, will do his best only if he is confident that his welfare is also keenly appreciated and his interests protected by the "home office". Also that his one and every question be answered immediately and his requests for supplies to carry out his work be attended to without delay. In the Barcelona office I had an inflexible rule that a letter from an agent never left my desk until each question had been answered and some comment made on recently received intelligence. Replies were constantly filled with cheer and enthusiasm and praise when it was deserved. When a question could not be answered by return

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in Barcelona. We acknowledged as a foregone conclusion that the Police knew who in the Consulate was carrying on extra-curricular activities but what we did do, and successfully, was to prevent the Police from finding out who our contacts were. Of the agents arrested in Barcelona, no arrest can possibly be traced as having been caused by personal contact with any member of our staff. None of the Barcelona agents of any of the chains had been arrested or interfered with in any way up until the time I left. We were indeed most fortunate in this respect and I am frankly proud of this record.

Our telephones were tapped by the Germans and we knew this but as far as the Germans are concerned this was a waste of time. No real names or addresses were ever mentioned over the 'phone. Each agent had a code name and when he had a pouch to deliver he merely called the Consulate from a public 'phone, asked for an extension and, instead of asking for a person when the 'phone was answered, merely stated his code name. Careful attention on our part kept all these numerous calls straight and no difficulty was ever encountered.

An interesting, though disastrous, case involving lack of security and an example of how an agent must constantly be on the alert are the following facts regarding the arrest in Barcelona of AJAJ and HOMO on the same day and at the same place, but at different times of the day.

Long before HOMO's arrival in Barcelona we were aware of the fact that the Police knew of the activities of AJAJ and since AJAJ and HOMO were old personal friends it was essential in order to protect HOMO that he never be seen entering AJAJ's house. I warned him repeatedly not to go there and a "neutral" meeting place was arranged where they could see each other. We had also arranged a "danger signal" to be given by the occupants of the house in case of the arrival of the Police or if it were noticed that the Police were watching the house. This "signal" consisted of the simple lowering of a certain drape in one of the front living room windows, which meant a warning to stay away. On a certain Saturday morning the Police appeared at AJAJ's house. It turned out later that AJAJ had been arrested on the street after leaving the house. The Police detained Lucie (AJAJ's wife) and servant in the house, searched it thoroughly and sat down to await the arrival of an unsuspecting sub-agent. It was merely the usual Police trap. In a moment while the Police were not looking, Lucie lowered the drape and then returned to her room to take care of the baby. HOMO that morning decided that, notwithstanding my most emphatic warning and order not to go even near the house, decided he must see AJAJ

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to act as guards. In other words, the responsibility for the protection of this American Consulate, located at one of the most strategically centered neutral spots in Europe, rested with the OSS -- the Consulate did not "have funds" for this purpose. Another reason I think our security was good is that none of my local contacts for the "communications chains" have ever been arrested. I never met one of these agents on the street. When I arrived in Barcelona I immediately saw that the lack of adequate and numerous safe meeting places was a danger which had to be remedied as soon as possible. This is infinitely more easy to see than to remedy. Nevertheless, eventually the Barcelona office was provided with at least fifteen safe meeting places -- spare rooms in apartments of trustworthy agents or friends, safe houses, for which in some cases it was necessary for us to pay the rent, etc. It was always my unbreakable rule never to stop my car in front of a "meeting place" I was going to. Consequently my chauffeur never saw exactly where I went. Invariably he let me out of the car two or three blocks away and met me two or three blocks at a pre-arranged spot in the opposite direction.

I had a supply of brown wrapping paper and cord always on hand at each "meeting place" and when an agent brought me a package of reports, square in shape and wrapped in newspaper, I left the building later with a round or oblong package wrapped in brown wrapping paper. This was an inflexible rule and neither an agent nor I was ever seen leaving a "meeting place" with the same looking package the other had a little earlier entered the building with. This was especially true in meeting the AKAK Barcelona agent with such voluminous material. In despatching voluminous pouches to France the packages were wrapped first in newspaper and then in wrapping paper, in the office. Once at the "meeting place" the outer wrapper was removed and the agent left the building with a package wrapped in newspaper and with a different kind of string tied round it. This method brought several favorable comments from the agents themselves, who were impressed and enthusiastic about the lengths to which we would go to protect them. Since it was necessary to see the AKAK agent at least three times a week and then on occasions twice a day, there were four different meeting places where he was seen in order not to become too frequent visitors at the same place.

Our office itself was adequately protected under the conditions existing in Barcelona. We had a strong safe, the doubtful protection of the American Consulate premises, reinforced steel filing cabinets and each member of the staff burned his own trash twice a day. Only the necessary real name and address records were kept. Since our activities reached such a large scale and we expanded so rapidly we could hardly hope to escape the attention of the local Police and counter-espionage organizations existing

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liaison with the Consulate, etc., leaving me time to devote myself entirely to the French chains. By that time it was apparent that more secretarial help was required and Queen was sent to increase our staff. She too soon became a key-member of the organization and, as the work was increasing every day, she became indispensable.

The number of cables received and despatched increased daily and, since the most important chains had been provided with one-time-pad ciphers, code work took up much of the secretarial help's time.

It was unfortunate that, due to Polar's leaving Madrid, Monte had to be recalled to take his place. This left a serious gap in the Barcelona office which could not be easily filled. Monte was soon replaced by Viking who, unfortunately, did not prove capable of taking over any of the activities in Barcelona and he was returned to Madrid. He in turn was replaced by Sisti who, although inexperienced, had a lot of common sense and ideas and developed rapidly and efficiently. However, and unfortunately again, it was decided to open an office in San Sebastian, and Sisti was recalled. He was replaced by Bergen, whose extreme youth, happy-go-lucky way and lack of languages, did not permit me to entrust more than odd jobs around the office to him. We did, however, carry on and by this time the chains were operating efficiently, and aside from voluminous letter-writing and the despatching of instructions, did not require constant planning and supervision.

Early in 1944 we were fortunate to have arrive in Barcelona a 100% Oil Mission man, who assumed the oil control work entirely and it was also possible to get him a separate office and secretary. This relieved the strain on our time to a great extent and permitted our undivided attention to the gathering of our intelligence. At about this time X-2 also opened an office in Barcelona, thus greatly relieving us of this time-consuming work. I shall comment on X-2/SI relations in a separate paragraph.

We were later indeed fortunate in being able to secure the assistance in Barcelona of 706, who proved to be extremely helpful and capable of taking charge of the office during my by then frequent trips to France.

Security: I believe that on the whole the security of the Barcelona office was extremely good. We were working under severe handicaps and much too overworked. The Consulate did not have a night watchman and, in order to protect our secret files and safes during our absence at night, it was necessary to recruit two trustworthy Spaniards, armed with pistols locally purchased,

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conditions along the frontier. The head of the chain was the Police Commissioner of Geret, and he provided several agents with false documents and border region travel authorizations in addition to providing us with samples of French documents which we had duplicated in Barcelona.

#### 2222 CHAIN

"Gai" is a young, enthusiastic Alsatian recruited by ADAD in Barcelona. Like all the others, he was carefully considered and briefed and despatched, together with a liaison agent to provide communications, to Nancy. His job was to cover the Nancy area and report to us through the "Jaime II" organization. In order to accomplish this we provided him with a safe "letter-drop" in Perpignan, from whence his pouches would be brought safely to us -- he to provide the communications from Nancy to Perpignan via the man who accompanied him.

"Gai" apparently built up a nice little organization in Nancy and for a short time we received enthusiastic reports of his progress. However, unfortunately "Gai" recruited an agent of the Gestapo in whom he placed full confidence and who soon betrayed his entire organization -- costing the lives of several and the deportation as slave laborers to Germany of several others. "Gai" himself barely escaped with his life. He had met "Armor" personally in Barcelona and by coincidence saw him in Lyon one day, thereby re-establishing contact with us. I felt at the time that the best thing for him to do was to join the UPRP chain and help "Armor", which he did, providing courier service for "Armor". This is the short and tragic history of what we called the "Gai" chain.

Barcelona Office Organization: In early 1944 it was necessary for SGO to leave Spain and SGI was transferred to Bilbao. In January 1944 we welcomed with open arms our first stenographic help, 1004. She was sorely needed and, frankly speaking, the Barcelona office could not have grown to the proportions it eventually did without her. She worked enthusiastically and intelligently and without one single word of complaint literally day and night, Sundays and holidays. Her language qualifications were perfect and she immediately became a key-member of the Barcelona office.

To replace SGO, whose absence was keenly felt, Monte was appointed and this combination was the most perfect attained at any time by the Barcelona office. Monte assumed supervision of all local contacts, i.e., local intelligence, BYDY, necessary

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## WIWI CHAIN

This chain, also known as the "Morere chain", is an old chain which originally operated direct from Madrid with the help of the now notorious "Carlos". At one time, I understand, it provided some interesting and valuable intelligence, but during 1943 "Morere", the head of the chain, was almost caught by the Gestapo and his place was taken by a sub-agent, "Lt. X". From this time on the quality and quantity of intelligence declined, and since it was not worth all the work required to keep it going, it was discontinued in mid-1944. "Morere" escaped to the Alps and later made his way to Spain where he was rather a problem-child, and we eventually got him to Algiers. I understand he returned to France after D-day and undoubtedly Zenda has arranged the final liquidation of the chain. It was through reports received from "Artichoke" that we found "Carlos" was submitting WIWI pouches to the SIPM for photographing before delivery to us, thus confirming beyond doubt our previous suspicions as to exactly where "Carlos" loyalty lay.

## OPOP AND OROR CHAINS

These two chains, developed and operated by AJAJ in the latter part of 1943, never developed into the organizations that had been hoped for. Headquarters for both chains was in Paris and, although it is known they recruited a sizable organization in the Paris region, their communications were weak and it was only with extreme difficulty and much careful planning that we were finally able to contact the OPOP chain through the AKAK chain. By this time "Hennessy", head of the OPOP organization, had not heard from us in such a long time and had not received any money that he had been forced to abandon all the work he had done and seek a job. He was beginning to start again, with the enthusiastic cooperation of the AKAK brothers, when the European D-day disrupted his plans. "Souk" lost contact altogether and we received a letter from him through a British chain via London after having been out off from him for about eight months. By that time it was too late to start over again.

## YAYA CHAIN

This chain, which developed from the left-overs of the "Durop" organization (operated by Commandant Divi from Barcelona), was taken over by the Barcelona office after Divi left for Algiers. Divi had become known to the Police and it was feared he would be arrested at any time. The YAYA chain operated only in southern France in the Mediterranean region, but during the time it operated it provided interesting information on coastal fortifications and

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the HHH chain who was behind the German lines secured a map of the terrain and charted on this map the location of the main German camouflaged artillery pieces and, with the map in his pocket, started through the lines. While crossing the country-side he encountered a peasant who was trying to get out of the line of fire and took him along with him. Evidently he told the peasant about his mission for soon after this he was struck by a bullet through the heart which killed him instantly. The peasant took the map from our agent's body and proceeded through the lines, reaching Allied headquarters safely and delivering the map to the proper authorities. With this map in hand our artillery and air force were able to concentrate on the camouflaged German positions and the advance up the Rhone Valley was assured.

#### NANA CHAIN

The NANA chain is an interesting example of how close coordination and cooperation between field offices can be extremely beneficial to the organization as a whole. It is also an example of the extreme importance and, I might add, the vitally essential necessity of the head field office (Madrid in this case) being thoroughly familiar with the operations that are being conducted in the field -- clear down to what agents are covering what areas.

The NANA chain was a Bilbao chain to start with but, curiously enough, the majority of the intelligence from this chain originated in the Mediterranean area. A single glance at the map will show the absurdity of having reports travel from the Mediterranean coast to the Atlantic coast and then to Spain via Bilbao. The Barcelona office was ignorant of this until 361 left Barcelona to take charge of the Bilbao office. Not long after 361 took over at Bilbao I had a meeting with him, and he brought up this matter which came as a flabbergasting surprise to me. We discussed in detail all the possibilities about improving the service of this chain and agreed that we could quite easily split this chain in two, at least from a communications standpoint, and thus greatly improve the efficiency of the reporting. A plan was worked out and discussed by 361 and the head of the chain, who readily agreed. I provided him with a safe "letter-drop" in Narbonne, on the Mediterranean, and henceforth all reports from this area came in via Barcelona while the intelligence from the Atlantic area remained under the control of Bilbao. The point I am trying to bring out is that, had 361 known absolutely nothing about what Barcelona was doing, he could not have possibly seen the possibilities of improving the service, and no one at Madrid had ever thought of it. From this time on the NANA chain was split into two parts and instructions, money, etc. for the Mediterranean operations were forwarded by the Barcelona office.

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various sections of this chain. Prior to PITCH's departure to the United States, the Barcelona office assumed supervision over this chain. PITCH left as his representative in Barcelona a friend and sub-agent, known as "Rossi", who was in charge of contacting the couriers of the chain and actually writing letters of instruction to the chain. "Rossi" worked closely with the Barcelona office and, to all intents and purposes, the ZUZU chain received all the supervision and care devoted to the other, strictly Barcelona office, chains. This chain contributed several most important intelligence reports, for which we received congratulations from Algiers.

#### HIHI CHAIN

This is our oldest chain and one which, although it lost more members than any other chain, provided us with some of our most valuable intelligence. It was operated from Vichy by agent number 1942-2-5, also known as Vichy-2 and who, by the way, is a woman of approximately forty-five years of age and an authoress. Unfortunately this chain had very poor communications from the standpoint of speed. It was, however, a chain which could be counted on and reported to us approximately every fifteen days. I tried every conceivable way to improve on the time it took reports to reach us, but for many reasons, too lengthy to discuss here, it was impossible. When, at a very late date, agent 1942-1942 came from France to Barcelona to announce that he could no longer provide the courier service between Toulouse and Bourg-Madame (on the Franco-Spanish border) I decided to call upon the AKAK "communications chain" for help and, although Vichy-2 was successfully "contacted" by Jacqueline of the AKAK chain, unfortunately a few days later the AKAK chain also crumbled and we were out off altogether. This, however, happened in July 1944 and by that time their most important work had been accomplished.

I might point out some interesting highlights of the accomplishments of this chain. A sub-agent, known as "41", submitted a beautiful report on a landing beach on the Mediterranean which brought forth enthusiastic comment from Algiers (this beach was used in the landing) and a request that he make an identical report on another section of the coast. This he did and the report reached us before the chain was cut off. Only G-2 can adequately explain what these two reports meant to the successful invasion.

After the landing and at the time the Allied divisions were advancing up the Rhone Valley, they met serious resistance from entrenched and camouflaged German artillery which was causing serious losses and temporarily delaying our advance. A member of

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## UPUP CHAIN

In December 1943 AJAJ met through the French Red Cross, a very intelligent, capable and above all, intensely patriotic ex-professor from Lyon whom we christened with the name of "Armor", after much discussion -- AJAJ insisting we should call him "Argus".

After due consideration and frequent talks on the subject it was decided to send him to France to establish headquarters in Lyon and cover that area. He left for France a few days before Christmas 1943 and the UPUP chain was thus created. "Armor" far exceeded our expectations and sent us reports from many places along his route of travel. We provided him with a safe "letter-drop" in Narbonne and he provided the communications between Lyon and Narbonne. His pouches came to us via what we called the "Jaime II" organization which, although the most expensive organization we had, provided fairly rapid and efficient communications for this and other chains.

"Armor" soon built up his chain, ranging from Marseille to Lyon and vicinity, and eventually developed into one of our best organizations. He was particularly energetic and efficient in organizing his parachute field program and as soon as feasible was provided with a radio operator parachuted by a plane from Algiers. He also organized large "tactical intelligence teams" which did valuable behind-the-lines work after D-day. The records show what this chain contributed to our victory in southern and central France.

"Armor" was also provided, as were the other chains, with a one-time-pad system of cipher communications with our office and in this way names, addresses and secret instructions were transmitted to him with the utmost security possible.

## ZUZU CHAIN

The ZUZU chain, originated by PITON and consisting mainly of personal friends he had known during the years he had lived in France, developed slowly but surely into an imposing organization. It reached its peak of efficiency in early 1944 and contributed valuable information concerning German activities in France, concentrating mainly on information of economic and political nature, available only in high quarters. It also contributed valuable reports concerning the activities of important German officials and collaborators. During the time PITON was in Barcelona he personally supervised this chain. We supplied PITON with the general directives sent to all chains and he in turn transmitted these and other instructions to the respective sub-heads of the

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During "Fritz" stay in Barcelona many problems were discussed and settled and it was planned that once we had ironed out all the difficulties involved in radio communication and parachuting, he would return to France and run the entire chain from Tarbes, traveling clandestinely between Tarbes and Lézignan. Unfortunately, during his stay in Barcelona "Fritz" was arrested by the Spanish police and the entire burden of running the chain fell upon my shoulders. AJAJ was also arrested the same day, which made matters much worse. I shall cover the interesting details of these two arrests under a paragraph entitled "Security".

During "Fritz" stay in Barcelona BYBY recommended a young Frenchman in whom he had the utmost confidence, as an honest and trustworthy Frenchman who was anxious to do something for the cause. I met him several times and had long conversations with him and finally introduced him to "Fritz". "Fritz" and I agreed that this fellow, whom we knew as "George Morel" might be able to organize a new "communications chain" for R-18 from Tarbes, thus reducing even more the time taken by the AKAK's to transport the HOHO pouches. After much coaching and providing him with the necessary documents and instructions, he was despatched to France. We heard about fifteen days later that he had arrived safely at Tarbes and were delighted to hear also that he had established communications direct from Tarbes to Barcelona and that a trial pouch was already on its way. The pouch arrived safely and we decided to switch the R-18 section of the HOHO chain away from the AKAK chain and let R-18 use his own new communications, reserving the AKAK communications as an emergency. "George Morel" returned to Spain about a month later to report personally on conditions in Tarbes and, after a short stay in Barcelona, returned to France to assist R-18 in gathering more intelligence. Unfortunately, soon after his arrival in France he was murdered under very mysterious circumstances and which are still a mystery to this day. It fell upon me to break the news to his fiancée in Barcelona and when I called upon her, the bearer of sad tidings, she announced tearfully that her Mother had just passed away also, thus leaving her completely alone in the world, with her Father whom she rarely saw as he is a Captain of a Spanish ship.

Soon after this the new R-18 "communications chain" established by "George Morel" began to break down and it was necessary to revert to the AKAK's for help.

The HOHO chain functioned up until the end and I have been assured that individual members of this chain did valuable work behind the German lines after the Mediterranean invasion.

The last I saw of HOHO he was working for Zenda on the penetration of the still existing German pockets at St. Nazaire, Lorient, etc.

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wanted to talk to him at length about the possibility of radio communication and the newly born parachute field program, permission was granted and he arrived in Barcelona on February 9, 1944. Although his health had not yet been impaired, it was readily noticeable that the strain of working indoors and at night had taken its toll and we were all glad to see him again and to make his stay in Barcelona as pleasant and restful as possible. At the second floor was "Francisco" the radio operator, intercepting the Mallorca/Madrid communications of the Germans and Spanish Military, and where it was decided "Fritz" should stay, since it would permit us all to congregate at one time without undue risk, and reap the benefit of hearing "Fritz's" personal report on conditions in France. This set-up worked perfectly and long and mutually beneficial hours were spent in discussions as to future operations.

During "Fritz's" stay in Barcelona a rather unfortunate incident happened close to his headquarters in Perpignan which, for future security reasons, required the moving of his headquarters to Tarbes. This was done but at the same time it involved a new problem of setting up an entirely new communications chain from Tarbes to Barcelona in order to avoid the delay of routing the "mail" to Barcelona via Narbonne on the Mediterranean coast. This proved extremely difficult and for the time being it was necessary to call on "Simon" of the AKAK chain to provide the communications service via his steady and efficient "communications chain". This turned out satisfactorily and no undue hardship was placed on the AKAK chain as a whole. While this set-up was far from ideal from an organizational standpoint, it was nevertheless essential that we do it at that time, and justified for the first time our original "trouble-shooter" idea of using "Simon" to patch the breaks. It was later destined to be of even more value. With "Fritz" in Barcelona and his principal agent, R-18, for central and southwestern France located in Tarbes, and with the Mediterranean organization and communications still intact, it was decided to split the HOBO organization into two chains with the central and southwestern headquarters and collecting place at Tarbes, serviced by the AKAK communications chain, and the Mediterranean area with headquarters at Lescignan in charge of "Cisco" and using the old HOBO "communications chain" via Narbonne, Port Bou (Spain) for this section of the chain. This plan not only improved on the rapidity of the reports arriving in Barcelona but also separated two men, each as a "sub-head", who were antagonistic towards each other.

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a whole. I taught him how to use double transposition cipher, thus providing a safe way of communicating names and addresses to him, and he left for France that same month. Thus the AKAK chain was born.

We soon realized that we had underestimated "Simon's" capabilities and that not only was he acting as "trouble-shooter" but was building up a sizable chain of his own which was destined to become the most efficient and valuable chain we had. In January 1944 "Simon" called for help in handling the fast growing organization, and we despatched his brother to France to assist him. This team work soon bore fruit and the AKAK chain continued to grow until, eventually, in May 1944 we were receiving three voluminous pouches from AKAK a week, with one and a half day's service between Toulouse and Barcelona, a distance of approximately 160 miles. The AKAK "communications chain" was exceptionally efficient, and I have the greatest admiration for the outstanding work done by the five men involved in transporting the pouches (some of these packages as large as two shoe boxes) from Toulouse to Barcelona in such a short time. It is almost unbelievable that such a great amount of intelligence traveled so rapidly without one single break. It is also interesting to know that this "communications chain" is still intact and can be utilized whenever desired.

Up until this time the AKAK chain had functioned alone and had not crossed paths with any of the other chains. We were holding the AKAK resources as an emergency in the event any other chain became cut off by the arrest of a vital link in the communications route. It is interesting to know that the AKAK chain also had two additional communications routes which could be used in an emergency and in the event the original one got cut. As I shall point out later in this report, the fact that the set-up of the chains was such as to allow safe interweaving of the chains in an emergency, several of our most important chains were saved at a time when events were moving fast in southern France.

#### BOHO CHAIN

Although the BOHO chain was operating efficiently in early 1944, "Frita", the head of the chain, was complaining of over-work, that he needed a change of atmosphere and that he wanted to come to Spain to consult with us on future operations. It should be pointed out that "Frita" was wanted by the Gestapo, having escaped from them twice, and was also wanted by the Spanish police for his participation in guerrilla activities on the Republican side during the Spanish Civil War. Since we had safe means of getting him from Perpignan to Barcelona, and we particularly

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Local Intelligence: In late 1943 we had in Barcelona two organizations known as the AJAJ and BYBY "mailing gangs" which were doing strictly local X-2 work. Within the limitations of time available for this all important work we worked as closely as possible with our helpful and most cooperative British counterpart. Since the Barcelona office had had no personnel to cross-index carefully the enormous amount of local X-2 material coming in every day, one of the first things I set down to do was to establish a card-index of all the names mentioned in the reports, thereby making order out of chaos. This I managed to do little by little and over a period of several months, in my "spare time". The importance of this work and the time dedicated to it bore fruit at a later date with some sensational (as far as our local operations were concerned) results, and led the British to consult us on X-2 matters more than they had in the past. Pitch also developed a small but very efficient X-2 organization in Barcelona which filled the gaps in the AJAJ and BYBY organizations.

We also had at the time an organization known as the Jaime-I "gang" which reported mainly on movements in the port of Axis shipping and also some oil control matters.

Spanish political reporting and, to a small extent, economic reporting was done by BYBY who, by the way, should still be in a very good position to continue this same work if allowed to do so.

"Chains": At the time of my arrival there were in reality only two chains functioning - the HOMO and HIMI chains. The OROR and OPOP chains had just been started by AJAJ, who handled them from Barcelona, but they were soon out of and never developed into full-fledged chains. The DUROP organization, although of questionable value, was also in existence. Headquarters of the HOMO chain were in Perpignan and those of the HIMI chain, in Vichy. Communications with the HOMO chain were adequate at the time, but a little too slow. The same applied to the HIMI chain, which was even slower. As time went on both these chains improved their communications, they on the French side and we on the Spanish side, until we were satisfied that we were receiving the reports as quickly as possible within the bounds of all important security.

#### AXAX CHAIN

In December, 1943 plans were completed to send "Jimon" to France to start a small intelligence chain of his own but, since we considered him an exceptionally capable man, his main function was to act as "trouble-shooter" for the other chains and to help repair breaks in communications and improve the service as

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OSS employees travel on a boat with, "by a mere coincidence", identical medical certificates. All that is needed is for one "Dr. Hardin" patient to become known as an OSS man to uncover all the rest using the same certificate. All personnel should be told what is required in the way of a medical certificate and they should go out and have it done on their own. Medical certificates are carefully checked and copied - at least when traveling on neutral ships.

Madrid: Upon arrival in Madrid I found that during my trip to the Peninsula, Silky had had to leave Madrid on short notice and Polar was in charge. It did not take me long to see that what was needed in Madrid was not an order of battle expert, but rather a big job was to be done in the field to gather more intelligence to create enough work in Madrid to make it worth while having a man dedicate all his time to order of battle. On Argus' and Polar's orders I proceeded to Barcelona together with SGO and his wife, who happened to be in Madrid at the time.

Barcelona: When I arrived at Barcelona on September 30, 1943 our Barcelona office consisted of only SGO, SGI and SGO's wife, without whom our work would have been more seriously hampered. The work was distributed as follows: half of SGI's and my time was to be dedicated to oil control (a most unsatisfactory and completely unworkable set-up) and SGO's time entirely to OSS work.

We had one small room, approximately twelve feet by thirteen feet, for the four of us, in the Consulate. The set-up was most unsatisfactory from a security standpoint, since it was necessary for us (and our visitors) to pass through the propaganda section's public reading room and the private office of the head of the propaganda section, where there were invariably too many people for our peace of mind. However, that is the best that could be arranged with the Consul General who was, to say the least, quite antagonistic towards our even being there.

We had two desks and two tables and numerous shelves on the walls to hold photographic and photostat machine equipment and, although we were very crowded, it did not hamper our work too much.

It soon became apparent that I could not do justice to either the Oil Mission work nor the OSS work. Prior to that, on one occasion, it had been necessary for me to drop the OSS work during four successive days in order to check a ship and installations. It was agreed at the time that, in return for my working exclusively on OSS matters, SGI was to work exclusively on oil control. It is out of the question to try to operate intelligence chains which require full time work and careful timing, and do other work which frequently requires full time for several days in succession.

**SECRET**



**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

MEMORANDUM

April 20, 1945

TO: Chief, SI  
via: Executive Officer, SI

FROM: A. Scott Lockwood

SUBJECT: Field Report

It had been originally planned for me to go to the Canary Islands and I was almost ready to depart when this plan was changed. The Ambassador in Madrid had expressed the advisability of having an order of battle expert sent to Madrid immediately, and, since I was ready to leave, it was decided that I should attend the order of battle course at Camp Ritchie. This I did and finally sailed for Lisbon on September 3, 1943.

Cover: My "cover" was that of an Attache to the Embassy in Madrid and a member of the Oil Mission. The arrangement made with the State Department had been that they were to pay me the standard salary for the job, but without the cost of living allowance, rent allowance, etc. which go with the job and which, in the many stages of registering, signing papers, etc. in the State Department, marked me immediately as a non-100% State Department man and many embarrassing questions had to be answered in as non-committal a way as possible but which, in any event, could not possibly stop tongues from wagging. If at all humanly possible, a man's "cover" job should not differ in any respect from that of other employees, and from the security standpoint his work should be greatly facilitated by allowing him to present a "solid and impenetrable front", especially amongst his fellow employees. This has not been the case in too many instances in the past and has been a constant source of embarrassment and needless, dangerous gossip.

At that time it was the custom of the OSS to have its personnel proceeding overseas have their inoculations and "shots" done by the Army Medical officer attached to the OSS and then, in order not to have a civilian leave with a army medical certificate, arrangements had been made with a local doctor, a Dr. Hardin, to issue medical certificates instead. What happens in practice is that altogether too many people leave Washington with a medical certificate, identical in every respect, signed by a "Dr. Hardin" and it is easily conceivable to have two or more supposedly unknown

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

MEMORANDUM

April 25, 1946

TO: Chief, SI  
Via: Executive Officer, SI  
FROM: Frank T. Ryan  
SUBJECT: A. Scott Lookwood - Field Report

The attached is an ably written report  
outlining the operations carried on during sub-  
ject's stay in Spain.

Subject will remain in Washington to  
take up duties with the Iberian Desk.

*FR*  
F. T. R.

Attachment

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, OSS

DATE: 1 May 1948

FROM : Chief, SI

SUBJECT: Field Report - Alexander S. Lockwood


16752  
Field Report

Lockwood

S.I.  
v. Spain

Mr. Lockwood has rendered an extremely valuable and interesting report on the Spanish Chains into France. Mr. Lockwood has talked at length with Schools and Training Branch regarding his practical experiences and difficulties. You will no doubt be impressed, as I was, by the fact that much of our early instruction actually "proved out" under field conditions.

*Whitney H. Shepardson*  
Whitney H. Shepardson



Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, OSS

FROM : Chief, SI

SUBJECT: Field Report - Mr. Leefbrouwer

DATE: 2 May 1946

The field report of Mr. Leefbrouwer is submitted herewith.

*Whitney H. Shepardson*  
Whitney H. Shepardson

Attachment

*Discussed with Mr. Thompson  
& Mr. Eric Barnes*



## Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, OSS  
 FROM : Chief, SI  
 SUBJECT: Field Report 634

16,762  
 Field Report  
 X 634  
 DATE: 3 May 1945  
 X SI  
 Africa Division

The field report of 634, Africa Division, SI, is submitted herewith, with accompanying comments by Mr. Boulton, Divisional Deputy, Africa Division, SI.


W. T. M. Beale  
 W. T. M. Beale, Lt. USNR  
 By direction

To discuss with  
 Mr. Boulton

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 APR 9 8 35 AM '45  
 DIVISIONAL DEPUTY

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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS: In this case conditions in the field which might be improved and specific difficulties encountered may be treated as one item.

(1) If at all possible, a better means of cable communication should be found. Sending cables through the British in Bissau often means that a message is delayed more than two weeks.

(2) Letter pouches sent via AMER proved to be a satisfactory manner of maintaining contact with the home office. However, it must be mentioned that the method is far from safe, inasmuch as a pouch sent from Bolama to Acra is directly handled by at least four people having no connection with our organization.

(3) Were another man to go out with my former cover, he would encounter considerable difficulty in writing his reports, inasmuch as existent living accommodations afford no privacy whatsoever.

(4) It is a simple matter to obtain sub-agents as such, but most of these are undesirable; primarily, they are of a quite low intelligence in general and, secondarily, because their only interest is money. Real trust can be placed on very few individuals in Portuguese Guinea. Most of them are the lowest of all Portuguese.

(5) The cover provided me offered no freedom of movement. Bolama is not centrally located, now that the capital has moved to Bissau, and very little reliable intelligence information can be obtained there. Everything funnels to Bissau, and Bolama receives only the back-wash.

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425

## Office Memorandum

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director, OSS  
Via Executive Officer, SI

FROM : 425

DATE: 17 February 1945

SUBJECT: Report on Assignment in Portuguese Guinea

I. WHERE STATIONED:

Departed U.S.A.

- 9 May 1943

Arrived Bolama, P. G. - 22 May 1943

Departed Bolama, P. G. - 21 December 1944

Arrived U.S.A. - 15 January 1944

II. WORK UNDERTAKEN: The purpose of my assignment in Bolama, Portuguese Guinea, was to make a full study of that colony.

III. WORK DONE: During the nineteen months spent there, it was possible to obtain an almost complete file of background material including reports of a hydrographical nature in the Bolama area, topographical maps of the Bolama, Bissau, and Fulacunda regions, production figures and facilities of strategic products, road studies from Bolama to Gabu, Portuguese Guinea harbor facilities, land-plane and sea-plane landing areas in the colony, etc.

In addition, a file was compiled of important personalities in that region. This included not only suspected and known enemy agents and/or sympathisers, but also individuals engaged in intelligence operations by the British.

It may be said that over 90% of the information reaching the Washington office during the period May 1943 to December 1944 on this specific region, was sent in by myself.

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# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

16.763  
SECRET

TO : Director, OSS

FROM : Chief, SI

SUBJECT: Field Report - No. 425

Field Report  
DATE: 30 April 1945

X 425

X 51

X Africa Division

The field report of No. 25, Africa Division, SI, is submitted herewith. Your attention is called to Mr. Boulton's comments on the work performed by No. 425.

*W. H. Shepherdson*  
W. H. Shepherdson

Attachment

*Typed with  
Mr. Shepherdson*

022

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DIRECTOR'S OFFICE

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(3) When I was stationed at Belfort I personally observed an absolute lack of leadership in the M.O. Branch for S.E. France.

(d) Difficulties in the field.

I found it almost impossible to get deserving enlisted men promoted. At Paris, or London Hqs. enlisted men holding less important jobs were rapidly promoted.

In conclusion, I believe the OSS is doing valuable work, but I believe more can be accomplished with fewer personnel and less wasting of money.

*Theodore Simon*

Theodore Simon  
Major, A.G.D.

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I then received orders from Col. Bruce to establish a base at Pontarlier to assist Allen Dulles in every way possible. The base was to handle radio messages, provide housing, food, transportation, courier service and supplies for OSS personnel working for Mr. Dulles. This was done. As I was the only American officer on duty in this town I aided American aviators escaping from Switzerland, and arrested and sent to Mesarcon U.S. Army deserters and AWOLs.

(b) When the 1st French Army advanced to the Rhine, I moved this base to Belfort where the same work was done for Mr. Dulles' mission.

After the fall of the Colmar pocket I moved the base to Iegenheim where prompt contact with OSS in Basle was very easy. As German was the prevailing language of this area, I asked to be relieved by an officer who could speak German.

(c) Conditions in the field which might be improved.

(1) More careful recruiting for the field. There was an excess of personnel in particular among officers of field, or simulated field, grade. Some of these men were obviously poor officer material. Others were "eager beavers" with no practical experience. Still others appeared to be interested primarily in having a good time or getting themselves promoted. It is believed that only men of excellent or superior abilities should be retained in this organization and all others discharged. No man at all is better than an unreliable or weak OSS man. This organization can accomplish more with less.

(2) Discipline. Lack of discipline in the field is hampering the accomplishment of the OSS mission. It is believed that discipline can be improved if all personnel are taken into the Army or all are returned to civilian status. Also discipline in the field would be improved if transgressors were promptly punished.

SECRET

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, OSS

FROM : Chief, SI

SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions - Major Theodore Simon, A.G.D.

DATE: 4 May 1948

*Field Report 16.775*  
*Simon, Frank*  
*x SI x France*

Major Simon's report on field conditions is submitted herewith. Major Simon has been placed on inactive duty as of 1 May 1948.

RT

*Whitney H. Shepardson*  
 Whitney H. Shepardson

*In May Simon here -  
 I went with to see him*



## Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Field Report 14 773

x Simon Frank

x S.I. x Frank

DATE: 4 May 1945

TO : Director, OSS

FROM : Chief, SI

SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions - Major Theodore Simon, A.G.D.

Major Simon's report on field conditions is submitted herewith. Major Simon has been placed on inactive duty as of 1 May 1945.

RT

Whitney H. Shepardson  
Whitney H. Shepardson

In May Simon here -  
I went with to see him

Mr. Thrun:

Major Simon is at present on terminal leave. He is getting out of the Army. Expects to be out about the 20th. He is in New York at the moment and today can be reached through the Barclay Hotel. After today he will be in the country. This information I got through Mrs. Hood, SI, who called Major Thurlow who is Major Simon's brother-in-law. Major Thurlow is on Ex. 2642.

General Downer, eg  
 Still ask Major  
 Simon to come to  
 Washington?

✓ RT



**CONFIDENTIAL****OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

16,794

4 May 1945

TO: Captain Harrison T. Barrow  
 FROM: Lt. Colonel Charles Brebner  
 SUBJECT: Report of Activities in the Field

Reference General Order #63, Paragraph 3, dated  
 18 August 1944.

(a) The undersigned is Executive Officer of the SO Branch, London, and as such has duties in the field beyond Staff visits to Army Detachments.

(b) Progress of work of the SO Branch, ETO, and its achievements are covered twice monthly in reports initiated by this officer at his permanent station.

(c) At the present time there is no indication of conditions in the field which might or should be improved. It has been normal policy procedure to take immediate action on the reports of field personnel and to immediately effect desired improvement.

(d) This officer has encountered no specific difficulties in the field.

*Charles E. Brebner*

CHARLES E. BREBNER  
 Lt. Colonel, Cav.  
 Executive Officer, SO/ETO

1st Ind  
 Operations Officer, ESO, 2173 Q Bldg. Washington, D.C. 4 May 45  
 To: Captain W. B. Kantack

1. Forwarded for your action.

*Harrison T. Barrow*  
 HARRISON T. BARROW  
 Captain, Ord.  
 Operations Officer, ESO

**CONFIDENTIAL**

- 2 -


16,794

2nd Ind  
Reports Office, Secretariat  
To: Director of Strategic Services

7 May 1945

Forwarded in compliance with General Order No. 63.

W. B. Kantack  
Capt., A.C.  
Reports Officer



**SECRET**

the reaction of enlisted men nor the fact that civilians attached to an army will have to work with enlisted men. My recommendation is not that all civilians be made lieutenant colonels, but that agencies sending civilians to work with armies get together on their handling of the matter.

#### MY FINAL REACTION

In this report I have listed some criticisms of OSI. I should like to emphasize that I regard these as minor. The most disturbing thing I ran into was the self-seeking attitude of too many civilians. I have seen operations blocked because an individual could see in them no personal gain or credit. I have seen civilians infinitely more interested in collecting souvenirs than in doing a job. There was too much scheming for personal aggrandizement and not enough for the prosecution of the war. Still, lack of sincerity was disillusioning.

However, I am very happy to have been associated with OSI: I am thankful that I found work to do while in the organization, and that I was extremely busy during my eight months in France. I knew that many civilians in both OSI and in OGI were not so fortunate, whether from personal choice, I cannot say. I think OSI has infinite possibilities for good and effective work, and I am confident that the organization will realize these possibilities. Finally, if I had it to do over again, OSI is the organization with which I should want to work.

*Waiter E. Brennan*  
Waiter E. Brennan

**SECRET**

-4-

fighting?" "What German units have the Russians identified as fighting on the eastern front in the past week?" "What references have Germans made to chemical warfare in the past month?" "Please send us daily a summary of every broadcast made in German from Russia." Requests of such kind we met in addition to our routine services.

Hellschreiber, too, began to send formal notifications of changes in rationing within Germany, the extension of some coupons, the cancelling of others, changes in travel restrictions, etc. These restrictions, usually announced at night, were to appear in German newspapers on the following day. We sent them immediately to our white and our black radio transmitting stations, and these would go on the air with them, telling the Germans in detail about further restrictions they were going to be subjected to. Since these restrictions would be verified verbatim in German newspapers on the following morning, our radio transmissions established ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ in the minds of the Germans a confidence in the news carried by those stations.

#### MY RESIGNATION

With four enlisted men as editors, all of them capable, conscientious, and genuinely interested in doing a job, my editorial help was no longer needed. The responsibility as chief of the unit was merely one of receiving requests by telephone or teletype and assigning them to one of the editors; keeping peace in the monitoring family, not difficult even though there were twelve Britishers working as monitors; and seeing that supplies and equipment remained at the peak. Lt. Charles Hoffman, who was attached to the section, offered to take this over inasmuch as it involved no writing. Colonel Powell, when I approached him on the subject, indicated his willingness to accept my resignation if the section ran smoothly and met all requests for one week while I was absent.

Consequently I took a trip into Germany, where a forward detachment of our monitoring section was working with the First U.S. Army, and to the Ninth Army Headquarters, whom we were supplying with information by teletype. Upon my return I found that both Colonel Powell and Mr. Alfred Toombs, OSS man and chief of intelligence, were satisfied that the monitoring section would run without me.

Mr. Toombs urged me to stay to do the type of work being done by Mr. Padover and Mr. Sweet, both OSS men, but since this would take me beyond the cessation of hostilities, and since I had already been gone from my firm longer than I had stated on Mr. Bodfish's assurances, my resignation was accepted.

#### ASSIMILATED RANK

Upon joining OSS, I was told that all civilians would be given an assimilated rank of captain, simply for the purpose of protection in the event of capture by the enemy. I worked more with OWI men than with OSS men, and OWI seems not to have the same impression as to the purpose of the assimilated rank. At any rate, almost all the OWI men with whom I worked outranked me by far.

Enlisted men, although they regard all civilians as just that, civilians, invariably ask, "What is your assimilated rank?" There is no doubt that they have more respect for a lieutenant colonel than for a captain, even though that rank may be only assimilated. Personally I regard the whole thing as unimportant, but one cannot deny

**SECRET**



-3-

**SECRET**

Operations Divisions. When the Germans staged their counterattack at Avranches in an attempt to cut Patton off from his Normandy supply lines, we had nightly bombings by the Luftwaffe. Although this was disturbing, since our work was done mostly at night, the monitoring section managed to deliver all its reports, and on time. When teletype communications broke down, we delivered them by courier. I cannot praise too highly the work of the enlisted men in our section. We were alone in a small Normandy field, about two miles from the Third MRB Company. The men worked without sleep, with only K-rations as food, through bombings, and did it enthusiastically.

#### WITH THE TWELFTH ARMY GROUP HEADQUARTERS

After we had been at Beauchamp some four or five weeks, the Third MRB Company, as well as the Second MRB Company, was recalled to the Twelfth Army Group Headquarters at St. Sauveur, where Colonel C. R. Powell was the Psychological Warfare Officer. Mr. Miller at first refused to return with his half of the monitoring section, and later received Colonel Powell's sanction to remain with the Third Army. My half of the section was attached to the monitoring section of the Twelfth Army Group, whose chief was Mr. Gordon Cole, an OSS man. The editorial work was now carried on by a Mr. Keiste Janulis, OWI, by Pfc. Amgott, and by myself. Besides the voice and Morse monitors we had brought, this unit possessed ten voice monitors of its own and a Hellschreiber, which received transmissions from German newspaper agencies to German newspapers. This unit, rendering largely the same services we had previously given in the Third Army, continued to function as such from St. Sauveur to Laval to Versailles to Verdun. At Laval the propaganda analysis came to General Bradley's attention, and he demanded a copy of it each day. Circulation of our Allied news bulletins steadily increased, many of the corps and division headquarters remimeographing them to reach more of their troops. It is amazing how scarce the news of one's own and other Allied units is in an operation of this kind, and since we monitored not only voice broadcasts but also the Associated Press, the United Press, and Reuters, our publications were literally devoured.

#### NEW ORGANIZATION

Shortly after reaching Verdun, Gordon Cole was transferred to Operations, and Keiste Janulis became chief of our section. This gain left Pfc. Amgott and me the only editors, and we returned to our fifteen-hour daily stint. Meanwhile, Janulis had asked for a transfer to SHAEF, but luckily before it came through, we managed to secure from the newly arrived Fifth MRB Company three enlisted men with training in journalism. This relieved the pressure on our editorial staff, and when Janulis was transferred to SHAEF and I became head of the section, we still had enough editorial help to meet all requests handily and on time. Requests from sources such as SHAEF, G-2, G-3, Eagle Tac, Lucky Tac, as well as from our own Intelligence and Operations divisions, began now to increase. Such questions as these were common: "What have the Germans said about the fighting in such-and-such a sector?" "What Allied units have been identified by the Germans in the past forty-eight hours, and on what sectors are these supposed to be

**SECRET**

16,808  
28 April 1945

Final Report

A Brackman, Walter

TO : HQ Division, OSS  
 FROM : Walter Brackman, Civilian  
 SUBJECT: Activities in the ETO

**SECRET****LONDON:**

Upon my arrival in London in May, 1944, I was well received by OSS and told that a series of interviews with various people would determine where I would best fit. My first interview, with Mr. Howard Baldwin, seemed to indicate that my background of German and editorial work would be of use in the publication of a German magazine then in the planning stage.

My second interview was with Captain (now Major) Patrick Dolan. His first question was, "Who recruited you for OSS?" When I answered, "Mr. Bodfish," his immediate retort was, "That certainly is no recommendation for you. How long and in what capacity had you known him before he recruited you?" I told Captain Dolan that I had never even heard of Mr. Bodfish until I received his wire asking me for an interview. After further questions regarding my background, Captain Dolan informed me that I was to be on a combat team which he was organizing, intimating that I had no choice in the matter.

In subsequent interviews with Colonel Whitaker and Mr. Oechsner, I told them about Captain Dolan. They assured me that the Captain "meant well," and urged me to ignore Dolan and to join a combat team. In both matters I followed their advice: I joined a combat team and completely ignored Captain Dolan. After being attached to SHAEF, I was immediately sent to Clevedon, England.

**CLEVEDON:**

At Clevedon, after an interview with Colonel Clifford R. Powell, I was assigned to the Third Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company. The Company, having been in Clevedon for some time, was already pretty well organized under the divisions of Intelligence and Operations. All civilians and practically all enlisted men had already been assigned to the various sections in these two divisions. While I was simply soldiering, waiting for an assignment, SHAEF sent a request for a daily analysis of enemy propaganda, to be transmitted to London by teletype each morning at 0700. I offered to write this analysis, using the material of the monitoring section, which was covering German transmissions for about eighteen hours each day. After several days of writing this analysis, I was assigned to the monitoring section and given the high-sounding title of Editor-in-Chief. Mr. Huntington Miller of OWI, head of the section, scrounged around trying to complete the equipment we needed, while I continued to write the propaganda analysis.

Several weeks later a forward unit of the Third MRB Company was sent to France. Mr. Miller, with two of our monitors, went. This left me in charge of the section with the obligation of completing the securing of equipment, writing the propaganda analysis, and putting out daily Allied news bulletins. I found that a Pfc. Milton Angott, a chap who had passed the New York State Bar Examinations, was doing orderly work, and I immediately requisitioned him to assist in the editorial work of the monitoring section. He remained with me throughout my eight months in France, an invaluable help.

**SECRET**

-2-

**SECRET**

While at Clevedon I had also to complete the purchase of my personal field equipment, since OSS had discontinued to issue clothing, shoes, shirts, socks, etc., in England. Some had been issued in Washington, but more was needed by each person going to the continent. Some equipment, such as sleeping bags, was still being issued by OSS at Clevedon, but I found that being an OSS man was not sufficient recommendation to get into that ~~MM~~ cache. You had to know someone, and I saw individuals not in OSS receiving such equipment when some OSS men were told that none was available.

Before leaving Clevedon for the marshalling area, detailed plans had to be made for the carting of all the delicate receiving instruments of a monitoring section -- the radio receivers, the Sound-scribers for making records of transmissions, the Morse receiving units. This required the building of boxes, the buying of hasps and locks, the purchase of immense amounts of packing material to avoid shock to the instruments. OSS had made no provision for the purchase of such items, whereas OWI had a special funds man on the spot to take care of such contingencies. Consequently I had to pay for such materials out of my own pocket if I wanted the equipment of our section to arrive in France in operating condition.

Again, in regard to paying men (civilians) in the field, OSS had made absolutely no provisions. This resulted in no end of confusion, and much imposition on the OWI, which, again, had a finance officer in the field to pay its personnel.

#### **MARSHALLING AREA**

The monitoring section interrupted its operation when the entire Third MRB Company was ordered to the marshalling area at Brook Heath near Southampton. Upon arrival there, we immediately resumed operation, supplying Lucky Tac with the daily propaganda analysis and the German High Command Communiqué, and supplying many other units in the area with news bulletins. After about a week, we crossed the Channel, reaching Normandy on 16 April.

#### **NORMANDY**

In Normandy the Third MRB Company established camp near Nehu, and the forward elements, who had gone to France earlier, rejoined the Company. The monitoring section began operations on the night of the day in which they landed. The section now consisted of Mr. Miller, whose time was entirely consumed by administrative details; two editors, Pfc. Amcott and myself; about eight voice monitors, capable of monitoring many languages; and about eight Morse monitors, headed by Lt. Charles Hoffman. We supplied the Intelligence and Operations divisions of our own Company and Third Army Headquarters, to whom the Third MRB Company was attached, with German, Allied, and Russian communiques, with Allied news bulletins, and with the daily analysis of enemy propaganda. We monitored from eighteen to twenty-four hours a day, depending upon the nature of the action taking place at the front.

When the First U. S. Army broke through, and Patton followed with a drive out of Normandy into Brittany, the monitoring section was split up. Mr. Miller took half of the voice monitors forward to devote his staff to monitoring of a more tactical nature, while I, with the remainder of the voice monitors and all the Morse men, was sent to Beauchamp, near Avranches, to continue the established services to Lucky Headquarters and to our own Intelligence and

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16,200  
16,200  
Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT


TO : The Director  
FROM : Executive Officer, MO  
SUBJECT: BRACKMAN, Walter

DATE: 11 May 1945

Attached is a copy of subject's report. It is our opinion that Mr. Brackman has performed his duties in a superior manner and is deserving of a letter of commendation, attached hereto.

2 Att:  
Report  
Ltr 5/8

*Reeve Hoover*  
REEVE HOOVER  
Lt. Col., CAV.



- 3 -

intelligence, or the economic and political situation involving Yugoslavia, or even such titles as living with the Partisans; but all of this would be only a twice-told tale. Therefore, it was better to devote effort towards the construction of a report which would give the reader some basic indication of the writer's background and reactions since entering OSS and also his personal opinions that might be of help, or suggestive power in the possible organization of future operations.

The success of Darien Mission is hard to appraise from my personal interest and viewpoint. We were able to supply the Partisan movement for a time with tons of arms, clothing and food stuffs. We were able to gather intelligence on military targets to warrant bombing and strafing of enemy troop concentrations and towns. There is no question about the value of assistance given to Allied airmen and POW's. It is only of personal interest to mention that during the entire period of seven months in the field only one-hundred and seventy-two dollars were spent out of the Mission funds. I do not bring this out as a matter of ostentation, but rather as an absolute fact that it was not necessary to spend large sums of money in the specific type of duties that we were performing. The personal satisfaction and contentment derived as the direct result of this work far surpasses any hardships encountered. I am only too willing to give full support and assistance to any work in which OSS wishes to place me.

Harry B. Plowman  
Harry B. Plowman

SECRET

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or for gold pieces, then ask for an explanation, but if the request is for ten pounds of salt -- send it because it is needed.

2. Lack of Information: It was very evident that field personnel were not always informed of changes in positions held by base officials that would have a direct bearing upon the Mission. For example, if a Mission's desk head or superior is being replaced then inform the Mission. Explain the necessity of the change and always give names and a little personal history outline of the new official if he is unknown to the Mission. In this manner, there will possibly exist a better understanding between all parties concerned.

3. Extending a Degree of Encouragement: I believe that it is quite natural for subordinates to appreciate a few words of encouragement now and then from their superiors even under the most suitable and pleasant surroundings. The same is equally true for those operating under the adverse conditions that often exist in the field. Field work may indirectly add more burden to already heavily laden shoulders back at the Theatre base, or even in Washington, but the Mission definitely should be informed of their worth and usefulness. I do not mean praise only, but also advice by which a Mission would benefit. No one can work alone -- he must have the cooperation and useful hints from those above him. It would be appreciated.

C. Conclusion:

It is difficult to express the full appreciative meaning behind the writing of this brief report. Much more could have been included, but the nature of such would only have a human interest value. It could have included details on methods and difficulties of gathering

- 7 -

Both types of men are essential, and each placed in the position for which he is best fitted will do good work. What I wish to bring out is that (1) recruiting of administrative and operational personnel should be separate, (2) that training administrative men will also include briefing of operational activities, and (3) that the training and briefing programs for operative duties should be intensified and more strict categories of tentative operational planning should be adhered to.

2. Better cooperation between Base and Field:

With the experience of some seven months of field work behind me, some of the difficulties encountered there seem almost too trivial to discuss or give much thought to. The following examples may be helpful in pointing out difficulties that might be avoided in future operations:

1. Supplying: Darien mission was no doubt very fortunate in the receipt of supplies. We almost always were able to receive supplies whenever the ETA of aircraft came over. Food and clothing stores were ample, and mail was most always included with the PX rations. But it was the little items -- items that almost no one would know why they were requested that counted. Items like mosquito netting, candles, insect spray and salt -- little things that meant so much to the men on such a mission. When such items are requested, you may rest assured that they are needed. All four men of this mission suffered unduly from dysentery which could easily have been avoided if we had had means of keeping flies from our quarters. If the request be for a radio, a jeep



- 6 -

nature of the field work and were subsequently often assigned to office duties of a very routine and monotonous character. A great many such men are dissatisfied and disgruntled. They do what is required of them but only by virtue of a sense of obedience and painful duty. I believe the adopted course of training has proved to be very good, equally so for both field and office men, since the office man is thereby made aware of the nature of the field men's work -- but I think somewhere near the close of the period of training, men should be picked either of their own volition or by careful selection and personal advice thereof for each branch of OSB. I have no doubt that such a policy would be practicable since there is always a sort of cleavage in the preferences, likes and dislikes in all groups of men. Some prefer to be on hand even though in a very minor position where broad general decisions are made; they like to be near the administrative headquarters close to bigger men, like to enjoy more or less regular working hours and conditions and prefer living in clean and orderly surroundings. Such men are office men. On the other hand, some prefer to live in an atmosphere of tension or uncertainty, don't like to remain in one place long, don't especially enjoy prolonged immediate association with supervisors, like to get their orders and be left to themselves to carry out the purpose of their instructions; they like to be on their own resources, like to plan and work out in their own way the details of each mission. Such men are bored by office routine and like to return to headquarters with a report of work successfully done. These men are suitable for field assignments.

- 5 -

- About December 1: Was twice visited by Colonels Huntington and Macfarland.
- Dec. 16-28: Due to enemy action in Lika, I was forced to move to the coast. Arrived in Split on 26 December. Had no radio contact for nine days, all personal kits were lost. Received word from Colonel Thayer to proceed to 5th Corps Headquarters.
- December 29: Returned to Bari due to illness and remained there in the hospital throughout January.
- February 8, 1945: Returned to Split to take over the base there and moved same to Zara. The purpose of the mission was for intelligence and also to supply other missions in Yugoslavia accessible by motor transport.
- February 22, 1945: Received signal stating that I should return to Washington for reassignment.
- March 4, 1945: Flew to Italy.

B. Conditions in the field that might be improved:

2. Training and briefing of personnel:

It is quite evident that in some cases personnel trained, for example, in either SO or SI never had ample opportunity to express their abilities in either of these lines. Some who had special training in one specific branch only had the opportunity to perform types of work which required other special training programs. Of course, we must admit that this is not the case of OSS alone, but of the Army as a whole. I do believe though that it does occur more frequently in OSS than in the other branches of the Service. Many men recruited by OSS for administrative work were never intended for field duty. It may be erroneous to say "never" but this seems most usual. I am of the opinion that in many instances men who have been passed through the regular course of training were attracted thereto by the interesting and romantic

SECRET

- 4 -

supplying information to the British concerning enemy, as well as Partisan order of battle, concentrations, political activities and also any economic information that would be of value. The evacuation of POW's and Allied airmen was just as important as the work mentioned above. Colonel Krieger of the 18th Air Force was very willing to drop supplies for airmen and when possible to land aircraft for the evacuation of same. During the period that I was in Yugoslavia, some sixty-three airmen were cared for by Darlen Mission. They were either evacuated by air or infiltrated to the coast where safe passage by boat to Vis or Italy could be arranged. This number does not include 132 (and many others) who arrived on November 20, 1944, by motor transport. We aided these people by feeding and bedding them, and by giving them whatever clothing we could supply.

Following are dates of only a few of the interesting events that occurred during my stay in Yugoslavia:

August 10, 1944: Flew to Korden and was received by Captain Conrad Selvig.

August 21: Arrived at Korden in Lika and contacted the commanding officer of the 36th Division.

Aug. 21-Oct. 23: Carried out above duties. During this time, twenty-nine aircraft with supplies were received; was able to supply enough air target intelligence for the Balkan Air Force to carry out five bombing raids in my area. This included the towns of Otoce, Gospio, and Bihac. During the same period, we evacuated sixteen airmen.

October 23: Darlen Mission became a separate American intelligence mission. This action, at the time, jeopardized relationship and prestige with the local Partisans on whose cooperation all intelligence gathering in that area depended.

Oct. 23-Dec. 10: Evacuated N/T operators Deane and Tompson and continued with intelligence reports and the evacuation of airmen.

SECRET

-2-

mand and the proper distribution of duties between these two missions. It was finally agreed that Barnett would move to a new area; and due to the almost continuous movement of the enemy in Croatia at this time, Bell evacuated and returned to Italy.

On 16 August, T. Korolchuk (enlisted Navy radio operator) and I flew to Kordun area of Yugoslavia and was there received by Captain Conrad C. Selvig. There I met my British W/T operator, Corporal Harry Deane; and a few days later, Corporal Vincent Tompson, RAF, of the Balkan Air Force, joined me as W/T operator for my direct link with that Air Force.

2. Geographic area concerned and economic conditions

After arrival in the Kordun, it was necessary to move into the central Lika area of Croatia and there join the 35th Division of the 11th Partisan Corps. This move of over one hundred miles was accomplished with a charcoal-burning truck, taking three full days to complete. Lika is in Croatia in the general area east of the Krapina and Velbit Mountains and west of the Bosnia-Croat boundary. Pre-war Lika was one of the less advanced areas of Yugoslavia, composed chiefly of small farms and home industries. It is peasant land, and only the larger towns such as Gospić and Otočac possessed electric and water utilities. The smaller settlements knew only an almost primitive rural mode of living exercised by wooden plows, cooking in the homes over an open wood fire, and the spinning of yarn (wool) by means even less modern than our ancient spinning wheels. The small towns like Udbina and Korenica were almost uninhabitable and the whole liberated

SECRET

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

11c. 713

TO : Director OSS, through Chief SI  
 FROM : Captain Harry B. Plowman  
 SUBJECT: Report on conditions in the field - Yugoslavia

DATE: May 7, 1945

## A. What I did in the field:

### 1. Introduction

The writer was recruited by OSS the latter part of September 1943, for a specific SO mission (the Cambridge problem) in the Middle East area of operations. First interview was with Lt. Comdr. Green (then Lt. Sr. Grade) who was with the Personnel Branch. Comdr. Green arranged for interviews with Mr. Manning, Mr. Berg, Major Young and Major Seibly, all then with Middle East FO Branch. The plans for this SO mission were never put into effect and I remained in Washington until January 1944, at which time overseas transportation was arranged to Cairo. In Cairo, interviews with Lt. Wood (Navy) and Major Scott Dickenson ensued; and along with Captain Rainer, I was accepted by Major Dickenson for his mission (Spike) to Yugoslavia. Later upon arrival in Italy, it was thought best by the British interest that only two American officers be admitted with the Spike mission; so being junior to Captain Rainer, I remained at Bari, awaiting assignment to future operations.

It was in July that the British Military Mission to Yugoslavia, headed by Brig. McLean wanted an American officer to replace Captain Barnett, British Liaison Officer, who at that time was operating in Yugoslavia along with a Balkan Air Force mission (B.A.F.s #1) under the direction of Squadron Leader Bell. The advisability of such a change was due to the frequent occurrence of questions concerning com-

SECRET

16,813

REPORT ON FIELD CONDITIONS  
by  
Captain Harry B. Plowman  
(Yugoslavia - - Darien Mission)

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1. Introduction
2. Geographic area concerned and economic conditions
3. Description of activities

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B. Conditions in the field that might be improved

1. Training and briefing of personnel
2. Better cooperation between Base and Field
  1. Supplying
  2. Lack of information
  3. Extending a degree of encouragement

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8

C. Conclusion

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

16, 813

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, SI

DATE: May 7, 1946

FROM : D. DeBardleben

SUBJECT: Report on field conditions submitted by Captain H. B. Plowman

It will be noted that Captain Plowman entered Yugoslavia as a member of the SO Branch. However, two months later the team of which he was a member was assigned to independent intelligence duties. Plowman was formally transferred to the SI Branch on December 18, 1944 -- four months after entering the country.

Captain Plowman's remarks on training stress the desirability of assigning personnel to duties for which they are best qualified and giving them specialized training in keeping with their assignments. I believe that such a policy is the ideal toward which OSS should strive. However, necessity demands many deviations from the ideal and personnel must often be used where they are most urgently needed rather than where they would best fit. Training must be sufficiently general to prepare them to the greatest possible degree for emergent assignments.

*D. DeB.*  
D. DeB.

**Office Memorandum**

**UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : Director, OSS

FROM : Chief, SI

DATE: 8 May 1945

SUBJECT: Field Report - Captain Harry B. Plowman

Captain Plowman's penetrating observations on training in particular have been brought to the attention of Schools and Training Branch.


*Whitney H. Shepardson*  
Whitney H. Shepardson

Attachment

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APR 8 5 30 AM '45  
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of relations with the FFI, instructed in double-transposition code and the use of the Army 300 radio set, evaluated and disseminated information for Div. 02, found soft spots in the lines and arranged for passage of agents and radios, sometimes accompanying the agents or "passeurs" into enemy territory.

On November 4, 1944, while enroute to Baccarat from Badleu to arrange for an operation, my jeep turned over because of a faulty steering mechanism, and I was sent to the 11th Evacuation Hospital at Bayon with a dislocated shoulder and a broken collar bone. In a few days, I was transferred to the 46th General Hospital at Besancon where I remained until December 23, 1944 with little noticeable improvement in the condition of my shoulder. On that date, nevertheless, I returned to duty with Seventh Army G2-SSS at Saverne. After a short time it became apparent that I would be unable to continue working without medical care and arrangements were made to send me to Lyon for duty under medical supervision.

Once in Lyon it was discovered that such supervision was unavailable there and I was ordered for treatment back to the United States, where I arrived, via Paris and London, on March 5, 1945.

R. B.

SECRET

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

7 May 1945

TO: Chief, SI  
Through: Executive Officer, SI

FROM: Romeo Balaguer

SUBJECT: Field Report

On February 1, 1944 I joined the OSS in Washington. After having been through Schools, S, E, B.O. and the "Farm" I left the United States on April 25, 1944 via boat, and reached Oran on May 4, 1944. On May 9, 1944 I arrived in Algiers where I was assigned for duty with the French SI Desk under Henry Hyde.

In spite of the usual difficulty of becoming integrated into this closely-knit organization, I soon found myself an accepted member of the team, with numerous duties in the Operations Section under DeWitt Clinton. This work included the intelligence briefing of agents, obtaining approval for parachute pinpoints, making false documents, (cartes d'identite, cartes d'alimentation, certificats de travail, and certificats de demobilisation), holding and processing agents in various areas, providing agents with black market clothing from France, obtaining operational equipment and funds, dispatching agents by plane and many incidental duties depending on the individual mission and the whims of the Joes.

There were, in addition, certain duties which were not directly connected with operations, such as, degarbling incoming code messages, which required a complete and colloquial knowledge of French, negotiation with the French authorities for obtaining permission to use freely Radio Alger for fifteen minutes a week to broadcast messages to agents in the field.

A short time before D-day (August 15, 1944) I was selected to stay in Algiers with Ensign John Garnett and continue the work of the base until our teams with the invading forces had established direct contact with the agents remaining in the field.

By September 7, 1944, because almost all of our agents had then been overrun and work at Algiers had correspondingly declined, I left Algiers by plane and arrived at Salon-en-Provence. I was assigned in France to Seventh Army Headquarters at Lons-le-Saulnier, and later at Epinal to serve as liaison officer with G2-SSS (assisting Lt. Carre) and to collect and disseminate intelligence.

Toward the end of September I was assigned to the 45th Division G2-SSS team, headed by Lt. Duff, where some of my duties differed widely from any in my experience. I recruited and briefed agents, took charge

**SECRET**

## STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

9 May 1945

SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions submitted by  
 Romeo Balaguer

Mr. Homer Hall, Chief of Western European  
 Section, SI Branch, has described this report as "A  
 concise, intelligent field report, submitted by an  
 SI representative whose operations were regarded as  
 most effective."

Mr. Balaguer is at the present time under-  
 going treatment for his arm. On his recovery, it is  
 anticipated that he will be given an assignment  
 appropriate to his very considerable capabilities and  
 experience.

Whitney H. Shepardson  
 Whitney H. Shepardson

16 820  
 Field Rep. V  
 A Balaguer  
 V S J  
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SECRET

obliged to act as liaison with the PFI for combat tasks. At one point, I even led a battalion of PFI into action and we captured one hundred German prisoners. We were successful in our intelligence mission, obtained intelligence that enabled the Division to take Lyon, Grenoble, with a minimum loss of life.

When the advance slowed down we were able to cover the whole army front of a network of intelligence agents which went weekly over-  
lays of German defenses and troop movements in an area fifty to one hundred miles behind German lines. We also placed a SCR 508 radio set in the midst of German artillery concentration and with it directed all divisional and greater part of Corps counter-battery fire. Specifically, my duties with this team, besides the command functions, were recruiting, training and putting agents through the lines, interrogation of agents and couriers, and writing up of all intelligence reports. I was wounded and captured on October 27, 1944.

#### CONDITIONS IN THE FIELD THAT MIGHT BE IMPROVED:

1. Any officer or civilian working under combat conditions should have a double identity so that in case of capture it would render identification by the enemy difficult. My name was known to hundreds of civilians behind the enemy lines and it was only by the utmost good fortune that I was able to escape identification by the enemy.
2. Provisions for helping agents' families or following up wounded agents are inadequate. In the heat of battle operational officers cannot look into these details as they do not have the time and aside from any moral obligation we incur it diminishes the efficiency of agents if these factors are not properly looked after.
3. Liaison between Washington and the field fell down miserably in my personal case since no one in Algiers had any idea who I was or why I was sent there to work and it was over six months before I was doing anything approximating the task for which I had been recruited.

*John L. Green*  
U. S. G.

SECRET

JLO:ds

**SECRET**

26 May 1945

TO : Chief, SI

FROM : Justin L. Groome, Captain, M.C.

SUBJECT : Field Report

I was sent to Algiers in June, 1944, to work with the French Desk, SI, there. Upon arrival I was transferred to Services and made Mess Officer at the Algiers Headquarters. I also acted as Medical Officer for the same headquarters.

On September 1, 1944, I was loaned to CSIRC as Liaison Officer and to direct field interrogation of the French refugees coming into North Africa and Casablanca. I interrogated approximately 15,000 refugees. In volume we gathered the greatest amount of intelligence received at AFHQ concerning France and were facilitated for our work by Air Ministry, London. As the stream of refugees dwindled, I began working more and more with Colonel King in our Casablanca office as his assistant and replaced him during his absence. Our main activities were reporting conditions within Morocco. We set up submarine patrol of the Spanish-Moroccan Coast Line and attempted a kidnapping operation of the Chief German Intelligence in the area (this was unsuccessful).

In April, 1944, I reported to Algiers where I worked on the Madras Plan with Frank Schoenmaker. I recruited and trained radio operators for the Spanish Chains and then directed operations for their parachuting into France.

In July, 1944, I left for Italy and landed in Southern France on 8-May, August 15, 1944. I was appointed Commanding Officer of the 36th Division Team of 324-C-2, 7th Army, and remained in that function until my capture. As my operations officer was captured after two days in the field, I performed the team's functions alone for almost a month. Gradually, personnel was supplied and at the time of capture I had under my command two operations officers, a headquarters officer, and four soldiers. Our duties and activities were manifold under field conditions. We were the only agency for forwarding intelligence with the Division. We had as our main task tactical intelligence for the Army but were forced by battle conditions to also obtain combat intelligence. In the absence of any SO representative, we were on many occasions

**SECRET**

**MEMORANDUM**

28 May 1948

TO: Chief, SI

FROM: B. H. Hall

SUBJECT: Justin L. Greene, Captain, M.C....  
Field Report

Judging from the attached report and from bits of information gleaned from others in the same unit, Captain Justin L. Greene, M.C., evidently went quite a distance "above and beyond the call of duty" in leading an FFI Battalion into a minor action.

It is my understanding that in addition to a wound in the foot, Captain Greene suffered frost-bite of the toes on both feet while in a German prison camp. He reports daily for treatment at the Walter Reed Hospital.

B. H. H.

Attachment

BHH:ds

**SECRET**

MEMORANDUM

23 May 1946

TO: Chief, SI

FROM: B. Homer Hall

SUBJECT: Justin L. Greene, Captain, M.C.--  
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Attachment

B. H. H.

BHH:ls

**SECRET**



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**SECRET**

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*J. L. G.*  
J. L. G.

**SECRET**

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

26 May 1945

TO : Chief, SI  
FROM : Justin L. Greene, Captain, M.C.  
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10 921

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

MEMORANDUM

28 May 1945

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FROM: B. Homer Hall  
SUBJECT: Justin L. Greene, Captain, M.C.,--  
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Attachment

BHH  
B. H. H.

**SECRET**

OSS Form 2025

FROM:

GREENE

SECRET

## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. ....

Date Rec'd. SA.....

To	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Rec'd.	Fwd'd.		
1. HALL					
2. <i>Rec'd. Chief</i>				<i>BMM</i>	<i>By hand</i>
3. <i>Chief</i>					Homer - Please prepare letter of transmittal from WHS to Director, OSS. Indicate (1) Where returnee served, (2) Highlights of the report, (3) Your very brief appraisal of his work also your agreement or disagreement with his observations, recommendations and what action has been taken to correct difficulties.
4. <i>Chief</i>					Return to this office for forwarding to Chief.
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.  
 A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.  
 Officer Designations should be used in To column.  
 Each Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.  
 Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.  
 Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.  
 For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

31 May 1945

MEMORANDUM

TO: Director, OSS  
FROM: Whitney H. Shepardson

16 9/5/1  
Field Report  
rec'd  
1 x 2  
x'm'd 6/5

HOD for WIS  
CSC

The attached report is a brief history of the experiences of Captain Justin Greene who served in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations and subsequently accompanied the 7th Army on its invasion of Southern France. An elaborate verbal explanation about his activities, his capture by the enemy and his release was given to the members of our Planning Board on 24 May and his written report is only a brief resume.

Although the early phase of his assignment in Africa was marred by confusion and misunderstanding of his assignment, he nevertheless fulfilled every assignment to the great satisfaction and praise of his commanding officers. His work in Morocco, where he was on temporary duty with CSDIC (Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Center) indicated a profound appreciation of the people he was dealing with and his contribution was consequently of the greatest value. After conclusion of his work in Morocco he was charged with all operational details of the Medusa Plan and finally accompanied the 7th Army at the time of the invasion.

During his assignment to the 7th Army Captain Greene indicated a degree of resourcefulness and energy far beyond any expectations. His conduct as Chief of tactical intelligence with the 36th Infantry Division awarded him individual commendation by his superior officers and contributed substantially to the high standard of the 7th Army OSS Field Detachment. As a prisoner of war, during which time he was wounded twice, Captain Greene showed unusual resourcefulness to conceal his affiliation with the OSS which resulted in his liberation without the enemy ever realizing what his functions with the army had been.

Several recommendations made by Captain Greene to improve conditions in the field and SI operations will be carefully studied and will undoubtedly prove invaluable.

W. H. S.

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

**SECRET**

TO : The Director

DATE: 6 June 1945

FROM : Secretariat

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Capt. Justin L. Greene, MC  
(OSS/7th Army)

1. Capt. Greene served in Algiers from June 1943 on. Assigned to SI/France, he at first worked as a Services Officer, later on prisoner interrogation, then directed operations for parachuting the Spanish Chians into France, and finally with the 7th Army was Chief of the 36th Div. SSS team. He was wounded and captured in October 1944.
2. He recommends use of a cover identity for any OSS man in a combat position in case of capture, and stresses the need for closer attention to agents' families in case of casualty to agents.

*S. P. Karlow*  
S. P. Karlow  
Lieut., USNR  
Reports Office

*Relief for 6/11*

Attachment

**SECRET**


To: \_\_\_\_\_

Neil Putz

↑ Please see that  
attention is paid  
to the recommendations  
Director's Office

OSS Form 3054  
(3308)

5/19/45





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37MM only had a limited intelligence objective.

e. Supplies as Exchange Item

Obtaining intelligence without reciprocating with supplies for the local population becomes a thankless task. Fortunately the British were sending large amounts of military supplies to our area which eased the way considerably.

f. Partisan Policy

The Partisans were much interested in obtaining as much in the way of war material as they could get and were not averse to playing off the Allies against each other when the opportunity afforded itself.

g. Pro-Partisan Interpreter

My interpreter became strongly pro-Partisan. At the same time he was openly anti-British. It changed his function from a funnel for intelligence to a screen.

h. Partisan Intelligence Reports

Partisan intelligence offerings could not be trusted, and because of the restrictions imposed could not be checked.

*Robert J. Weiler*  
Robert J. Weiler  
Captain, Ordnance

**SECRET**

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my contribution would have been considerably lessened. What training I did get I had to beg for.

b. Waiting and Uncertainty in Obtaining Mission

The long period of waiting between the time I joined the OSS in Cairo and the time I actually got into the field could and should have been profitably employed. As it was I was assigned to a mission with Mihailovich by Cairo. This was cancelled. I was then assigned to western Bosnia and sent to Bari. In Bari this mission was discarded, and I was to go to Vojvodina. This mission was approved by Operations, Caserta, but was discarded. I was then to go to the Dalmatian Coast and Eighth Corps. I got as far as Vis when the matter of an American Mission with Tito came up. We were advised to return to Bari by the Partisan Commandant, Colonel Cerni. Finally I was assigned to the mission to Slavonia, which ultimately came off. The period of waiting had been from February 1944 to 11 September that same year. The composition of the team changed several times during that period as well.

c. Unimportance of Mission

Requests for withdrawal of the team were rejected for the reason that the area was important. The British considered the area dead or sterile for two months before I took the plane out.

d. Inadequate Processing of Reports

So far as I could find out in Caserta my reports were never assembled and edited to present a complete and chronological tabulation of events in Sixth Corps area. From any results that I was able to find the team served only one main function - to check on the British activities in the field. ISLD apparently did not forward to OSS or did not forward in time nor in useful form the reports of their teams in the field.

**SECRET**

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matters of existence and operations.

d. Intelligence from Other Areas

Field teams, because of their isolated position, do not know about events in neighboring areas, events that may ultimately affect the situation in other areas.

e. Training of Personnel

More adequate training in information pertaining to the purpose of the mission is needed. For example, if military intelligence is the purpose of the mission, knowledge of the enemy battle order in detail is a prerequisite.

f. Screening Personnel

Personnel sent on missions should be more thoroughly screened particularly as to inclinations of a political nature. For example, a pro-Partisan leader or a pro-Partisan interpreter is unsatisfactory as a non-partisan agent for the transmittal of intelligence.

g. Promotions and Promises

Promotions for team members in the field are not sufficiently pushed. Many people have been promised much. Many of them have received little. The fact that promises should never have been made does not alter the fact that the failure to keep the promise is hard on morale.

3. Specific Difficulties of Which I Personally Became Aware

a. Personal Training

My own training was woefully inadequate. I had had almost no training in Battle Order on the German Army. It so happened that the British Intelligence Officer was very well informed on such matters or

**SECRET**

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the team, because of the apparent futility of the proposed new assignment, and because of the desire to return home, the undersigned having then been overseas for twenty-nine months. The interpreter was returned to Italy on 5 February 1945, for the reason that he and the undersigned seemed to be in constant conflict over policy and behavior.

2. Conditions in the Field that Might be Improved

a. Duplication of Effort

It would seem a waste of manpower and expense to maintain teams of more than one Ally in the same area. If one Ally or the other is not willing to turn over all material gathered, and turn it over to the other in time to be of value, the remedy lies in a conference at headquarters and not in duplicating effort in the field. Duplication in the field causes either competition between the Allies, or the subordination of one to the other. Neither is satisfactory in that it gives the local people a bad impression.

b. Situation at Base

Teams in the field have not been kept adequately informed on changes taking place in Base areas. For example, we were using a directional antenna beamed at Bari, not knowing that the receiving station had been moved to Rome. We were taken off the Roster of parashutists with consequent loss of pay without being informed. New Desk heads were appointed without our being informed.

c. Inexperienced Desk Heads

Desk heads seem not to be thoroughly familiar with field problems and difficulties; one would not expect knowledge of peculiar problems and exceptional cases, but one would expect familiarity with the routine

**SECRET**

- 3 -

set up a radio network in the area, with Partisan assistance, and that the British were present when the plan was presented to the Allies and the undersigned was not, the British ISLD representative was selected to make the daily contact. Therefore, the British got the intelligence and provided the American team (Walnut) with the material that was obtained. So far as could be ascertained, no information was withheld by the British. The team led by Captain Nowell was working as an SO team, and was not much interested in general Military Intelligence. The party led by Major Flues was attempting to infiltrate into Hungary, and had little interest in the local intelligence material. Within a month the other two American teams and one British team were withdrawn, leaving the Walnut Team, ISLD, and 37MM. The work of the Walnut Team was, therefore, that of sorting, and transmitting such intelligence reports as the British turned over, and the obtaining of such general impressions of the Partisans and Yugoslavia as was possible within the limited range of movement allowed by the Partisans.

e. Lessening Value of Intelligence and Withdrawal of Team

The amount of intelligence obtainable decreased steadily, and though some items of importance and of interest continued to come in from time to time, the value of the work also diminished. On 15 February the Germans forced the Corps Headquarters and the Allied Missions to move. For a period of two weeks all intelligence reports ceased. The Walnut Mission returned from the field on 12 March 1945, with the intention of ultimately joining to Partisan 3rd Army Headquarters which included in its territory the Sixth Corps. This move was never actually made although a team did get as far as Belgrade in the hope of going on. The undersigned had meanwhile disassociated himself from

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- 3 -

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proposed, and operations commenced with the landing by plane in Partisan Sixth Corps territory in the early hours of 12 September 1944.

b. General Duties and Team Composition

As understood by the undersigned, the duties of the Mission with the Partisans were the collection of primarily Military Intelligence, and in addition such other items of general intelligence as seemed important or particularly interesting. To accomplish this result, the team was made up of three members: the undersigned, a radio operator, and an interpreter. The team name was "Walnut" for operational purposes, and "Bluefish" in the reports section.

c. Other Units in 6th Corps Area

The Partisan Sixth Corps area was already somewhat over full of Allied personnel upon our arrival. Major Flues and party, and Captain Nowell were there from OSS. In addition, there were three British teams representing 37MM, ISLD, and "A" Force. Partisan Sixth Corps, although extensive in area on paper, actually was largely confined to the Papuk Mountains and the Psunj.

d. Intelligence Procedure in 6th Corps

The Walnut Mission arrived at a time when the Partisan Headquarters was beginning to look with a critical eye at the operations and activities of all the Allies (Russia excepted), and, consequently, in accordance with the wishes of the Sixth Corps Headquarters, contacts for the purpose of obtaining intelligence were limited to strictly official channels, and were further restricted by the request that only one officer make the daily contact with Corps Headquarters. In view of the fact that the British were already on the ground, and that the British had already

**SECRET**

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, OSS  
Through Chief, SI  
FROM : Robert J. Weiler, Captain, Ordnance  
SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions

DATE: 23 May 1945

## 1. What I Did in the Field

### a. Background

The undersigned was recruited in Cairo, Egypt, in February 1944. At that time, the undersigned was on Detached Service from the 254th Ordnance Co. (MM) with the Headquarters Commandant, USAFIME, as personnel officer. The undersigned had already been overseas sixteen months serving with the Ordnance Department in Eritrea, Tripoli, and Benghazi. While in Tripoli, the undersigned became acquainted with Major Soot R. Dickinson, at that time Ordnance Officer for the Tripoli Base Command, but who later became a member of OSS through the Cairo Headquarters. When the undersigned returned to Cairo, he again came in contact with Major Dickinson then working for the SO Branch of OSS, Cairo. The idea of joining OSS was first brought up in the course of conversation with Major Dickinson. Concurrently a drive was being made by OSS in Cairo to recruit personnel for OSS work. The undersigned met with Lt. Comdr. McBaine and Lt. Wood, both Navy Officers serving with OSS. It was the original intention of the undersigned to be assigned to the SO Branch, but because of the recruiting drive there was a slight mix-up and the undersigned was assigned to the SI Branch. Several missions were proposed to the undersigned, approved and then discarded for reasons unknown. In August 1944 the Mission to Slavonia was

SECRET



16.832

## REPORT ON FIELD CONDITIONS

by

Robert J. Weiler  
Captain, Ordnance

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SECRET

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valuable teacher and it is expected that such deficiencies  
will not be found in the future.

*Whitney H. Shepardson*  
Whitney H. Shepardson

Attachment

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

26 May 1945

16,932  
Field Report  
x Weiler, Capt. R. J.  
x SI  
x Yugoslavia

MEMORANDUM

TO: Director, Office of Strategic Services  
FROM: Chief, SI Branch  
SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions,  
Capt. Robert J. Weiler

Held  
for  
WFO  
etc

1. Attached herewith report of above named returnee who served in a mission in Yugoslavia.
2. This is a frank report of a mission which proved to be unprofitable. It is reasonable to expect that certain undertakings will prove unproductive but when such proof has been established, changes should be made without delay.
3. In paragraph 2 a, Page 4, Captain Weiler criticizes the duplication involved in having British and American representatives covering the same area. Independence of intelligence activities would appear much more important than the undesirable features of duplication as described. Denial of independent action by the Partisans reduced the value of SI activities greatly.
4. The criticisms contained in paragraphs 2b, c, d, e, f, g and 3 seem reasonable and justified -- confirmed by others of similar experience. Experience has been a

WFO  
SI  
YUGO  
OFFICE

## Office Memorandum

**SECRET**

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: 12 June 1945

FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office


SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Capt. Robert J. Weiler  
(SI/Jugoslavia)

1. Capt. Weiler was Chief of the OSS "Walnut" team with the Partisan 6th Corps in Yugoslavia from September 1944 to March 1945. .
2. The "Walnut" team was frankly an unsuccessful mission because of Partisan uncooperativeness, the previous arrival of several British missions, and inadequate briefing.

slk.  
S.P.K.

Attachment

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charge and it was difficult to get gas.

Dropping of supplies by British plane was not very efficient. They spread our supplies all over a large area. We hunted two days before finding all our chutes. Cylinders were overloaded and much of our supplies and equipment were damaged. On our original drop some 11 to 12,000 rounds of 9 m/m ammunition were packed into our things that caused considerable damage.

When I went up to meet the boat at Kaifa--at considerable damage and effort--our courier presented me with a very nice bill of lading for two new radio sets that weren't there. Fortunately I got enough parts to repair the old one.

Larry didn't get supplies or equipment for his mission and we had to give him some of ours.

*John S. Fatsess*  
John S. Fatsess

During the negotiations we learned of the eight Germans, officered by Captain Dyakoff who had been left behind. We demanded their surrender and after haggling with the Security Battalions got them to allow the Germans to surrender. They did, with all equipment, including a folk-wagon--but without their radio and papers which they had time to destroy. They were later turned over to Colonel Ted of the British forces then stationed at Kythira.

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standard policy.

2. Radio Equipment:

Radio sets should be more sturdily constructed. British models were more cumbersome but seemed more dependable.

3. Briefing:

More detailed briefing should be given for the specific assignment--more study of terrain and conditions in the area of operations.

4. Security:

Security in general was not as tight as it might be. Provision should be made to keep agents away from the offices entirely. This is not done at Cairo and at Bari it seemed worse. Too many people knew about "GRB" and yet agents had to report to its offices.

5. Specific Difficulties of Which I Personally Became Aware:

Was acting as Captain, AVB, without real or forged papers and at time of negotiations with Security Battalions, particularly at Kalamata when I was alone, it might have meant my head if they had demanded that I give proof of being an American officer and not an Andart posing as one. Fortunately their Secretary, Angelopoulos, was a former team mate of mine, on the Greek National track team '55, and he warmly received me and there was no question as to whether I was an American or not.

The orders to change back and forth from uniform to civilian clothing was embarrassing since it made everyone assume I was attached to intelligence. All the boys experienced the same difficulty and some had to put on 2nd Lieutenant bars after having been acting as Captains.

We had much trouble with our radio sets that seem to be very delicate. Also had trouble with British batteries that would not hold a

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leaders and was informed that ELAS would not lay down arms and would fight unless Government disbanded Sacred Battalion and Mountain Brigade. Brought Milton and Skokos to Athens on 19 November and on 20 November left with Kanes on trip to Peloponnese and Island of Kythira for political and economic information.

17 December British pulled out of the Peloponnese and Kanes and I were left behind to keep Headquarters posted on events going on in ELAS occupied territory (battle of Athens then going on).

On 3 January came into Athens during the last day of the battle on pass from ELAS and was flown from Elefsina to Kalamaki, taken by car to Headquarters.

Returned to Peloponnese on 17 January. Made a round of Sparta, Tripolis, Githion, Kalamata, Georgitsi and other places, reporting on treatment of ELAS prisoners, economic and political conditions. Returned to Athens on 4 February. Acted as Reports Officer until flown to Cairo on 2 March. From 3 March until the time I was shipped home I worked on translating reports of Greek agents into English. Reported at Washington 11 April 1945.

B. Conditions in the Field that Might be Improved:

1. Cooperation Between Departments:

On the whole conditions in the field were good because we were supplied with our absolute necessities and money which could buy most anything even during occupation. However, there should be closer liaison between the desks and the dispatching agencies. Fortunately in our case Captain Gerald F. Elze came along and took care of it for us at Bari and Brindisi. It would be well if it were

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a series of battles at Meligala, Pylos, Megolopolis. In the meantime the British reversed their policy and Captain David Gibson of the British asked me to work with him in negotiations at Gargalianos (unsuccessful) and then at Tripolis where we were successful in staving off a battle that would have resulted in at least 1500 casualties on both sides. (For details see reports turned in at Athens in October 1944.)\* We then escorted 850 Security Battalions from Tripolis to Miloi and put them on caiques for Spetses where they were interned until they were liberated by the British in December. They took part with the British in fighting against ELAS (See Jan reports). Also negotiated the surrender at Nafplion. At all conferences I was spokesman for the Allied Mission since I have a good command of Greek.

On 16 October I reported to Athens on orders and on 17 October I left for Chalkis to bring medical supplies and replace John Calvoceressi who had been critically wounded. Took part in the negotiations at Chalkis and Psaluna and the surrender and internment of 1800 Security Battalions at the Barracks at Chalkis. Also turned in a report on economic conditions and detailed map and drawing of the harbor and mine fields.

6. Activities after Negotiations were Finished:

Brought Calvoceressi to Athens on 27 October. On 31 October took George Skouras and Connie Forles on a trip all through the Peloponnese, where Skouras photographed most of the important areas that were destroyed by the Germans. Brought Skouras back to Athens on 10 November. On 17 November went to Patras and talked with Andart  
 See page 7 for footnote.

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by profession, who after liberation became Secretary of the "Komarhiaki Epitropi" (the State Committee) and an influential leader in the acting government, did much to help us gather economic information--facilitating our transportation, passes, etc., and the supplying us with leads for following up information we were after.

On 12 August I left on a trip alone up to Kaifa to meet the British mail boat in order to mail our pouch, pick up radio parts we needed, and to contact Larry's mission further north. This trip took me through many towns and villages where I could personally observe conditions in general. Many of the areas were patrolled by German and Security Battalions. Some of these towns were Georgitsi, Boura, Derbouni, Andritseva, Lala, Paloumba, Isari, Zaharo, Figalia.

I contacted Larry, mailed the pouch, got my radio parts, and returned back to base on 2 September. By then the Germans were moving out and we were giving fairly detailed accounts of their movements by radio. The Andartes also became very active in their preparations to attack and "liberate" the cities from the Security Battalions. At this time we also made repeated pleas for at least token troops to be sent to avoid the inevitable battles. Germans moved out of the southern Peloponnese 5 September.

5. Part in Negotiations between ELAS and Security Battalions:

September 5 to 8 we were constantly with the Andartes trying to get them to offer reasonable terms to the Security Battalions (see detailed messages in files). On 8 September Panos and I entered Kalamata and conferred with the members of the Collaborationist Government for over three hours--unsuccessfully and then left for the mountains again. On 9 September ELAS attacked, won, and then followed

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### 3. Method of Operation:

In general, we operated as follows: We established our base in a dense wood one and one-half hours walk from Nedussa, just about at the point where the three "states" or "nomes" of Arcadia, Messenia and Laconia meet. Sgt. Kanes was left there to keep radio contact with Cairo and watch the base while Panos and I set up our information system and kept contact with the Andartes. For security reasons, we hired no help nor purchased slaves that would have necessitated having men around constantly. At Nedussa we had two members of the Pefanis family who did our buying for us at Kalamata and also acted as couriers for our agents, Adem, Alkis and George.

### 4. Source of Information:

RAM-ELAS cooperated very closely with us in respect to military information concerning the movements of the Germans, installation and strength of garrisons; and also let us question their prisoners. We used their information as a check on that gathered by our men and vice versa. The RAM-ELAS organization was very well organized--and surprisingly thorough for a guerrilla organization. They had infiltrated well into the occupied cities and many of their agents had good jobs with the collaborationist government. In addition to RAM-ELAS, we were assisted by the "Allilengis" or Mutual Aid Society that was non-political. They gave us valuable economic information and greatly aided us in compiling our economic reports turned in to our office in August, and later the periodic reports after liberation. In addition to the above sources Alex Ponsias, an Agriculturist

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, OSS  
through Chief, SI

DATE: May 21, 1945

FROM : John S. Patseas

SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions -- Helot Mission -- Greece

A. What I did in the field:1. Departure from the United States and assignment in Cairo:

On 17 December 1943, left Miami, by air. Arrived at Cairo, 23 December 1943, and was loaned to Schools and Training. Instructed at Cairo school from 3 January 1944 until 30 May 1944; taught SI subjects and gave special briefing to agents and operatives leaving for the field. Instructions were in English and Greek. Period of 1-25 June was spent in Bari and Brindisi, Italy, taking parachute course and preparing mission for entry into Greece.

2. Arrival in Greece:

On the night of 25 June, our Mission, comprised of Panos Sakellariou (Captain, Greek Air Force), Sgt. Charles Kanes and myself, were dropped on Mount Taegetos on a small field near the Villages of Nedussa and Dirachion where we were received by two members of a British mission, "Carpenter", who helped us a great deal during our first days in Greece. Panos and I made first contact with the EAM-ELAS at Dirachion, on 27 June, and we were well received although it soon became obvious that we were to be watched constantly and that an effort would be made to "educate" us. This, however, was discontinued about a month later, when they were convinced we were not involving ourselves in internal politics.

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16.833

## REPORT ON FIELD CONDITIONS

by

John S. Paterson

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16.715  
 OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
 WASHINGTON, D. C.

28 May 1946

MEMORANDUM

TO: Director, Office of Strategic Services  
 FROM: Chief, SI Branch  
 SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions,  
 Mr. John S. Paterson

Halt / at  
 WJ  
 COK

1. Attached herewith report of the above named returnee who was sent from Cairo to Greece. Subject was one of our best field men. It is felt that his suggestions are reasonable and constructive.

2. Supply was, as always, a problem. It is safe to say that the great importance of supplying our field teams is now appreciated and receiving deserved consideration.

3. Reference paragraph C., Page 8, the quick-change routine therein described certainly demonstrated no profound planning or inspired ingenuity.

4. Mr. Paterson has been assigned to FIC-SI to serve as an instructor in SI in China.

*William H. Harrison*  
 William H. Harrison

Attachment

## Office Memorandum

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director  
 FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office

16, 753  
*Field Rep*  
*Fatsas*  
 DATE: 14 June 1945

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: John E. Fatsas  
 (SI/Greece)

Chief of "Melot" mission that parachuted into Greece in June 1944, Mr. Fatsas describes his adventures and accomplishments in good detail, both in gathering intelligence on the Germans and in efforts to avert battles between ELAS forces and Security Battalions.

*S.K.*  
 S.P.K.

Attachment

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